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NOTES
Constitutionally Mandated Southern Hospitality: National Solid
Wastes Management Association and Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Alabama Department of
Environmental Management
[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.'
The United States produces over 600 billion pounds2 of hazardous waste3
each year. In dealing with this ever increasing volume of waste, some states
choose to export the problem to their neighbors rather than enter interstate dis-
posal agreements or provide storage and disposal facilities within their own bor-
ders.4 Resistance to the latter options, borne in large measure from political
expediency, gives new meaning to the idea of "swim[ming] together."5 States
that acquiesce to the public outrage that often accompanies an attempt to site
and build a hazardous waste disposal facility6 are making states that have en-
1. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
2. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10388 (1989) (citing Environmental Protection Agency,
Environmental Progress and Challenges: EPA's Update 85 (Aug. 88) (#EPA-230-07-88-033)).
3. Congress has defined "hazardous waste" as
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration,
or physical, chemical or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A) & (B) (1988).
In other environmental legislation, Congress has defined "hazardous substance," 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (1988) and 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2) (1988), "toxic pollutant," 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988),
and "hazardous material," 49 U.S.C. §§ 1802(2), 1803 (1988).
4. Traditionally, the most common method of hazardous waste disposal has been land dispo-
sal, but this method currently is disfavored by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) because
it provides only a short-term solution to the waste disposal problem. Landfilling still is popular,
however, in large measure because it is a relatively inexpensive method for disposing of hazardous
waste. The modem treatment techniques fall into five categories: (1) thermal treatment (incinera-
tors); (2) immobilization (adding materials that combine with the wastes either physically or chemi-
cally, or both, to keep it from moving into groundwater or other areas where it can cause harm); (3)
physical treatment (separating the waste into two or more streams with the resultant streams being
effectively treated by another process, such as incineration or immobilization); (4) chemical treat-
ment (changing the chemical makeup of the waste so that it is no longer hazardous, or pretreating
the waste to make it easier to handle complex hazardous waste mixes. The products of chemical
treatment generally require further processing through one of the other disposal methods); and (5)
biological treatment (using microorganisms to render potentially toxic materials harmless). 19
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10388-92 (Sept. 1989).
Because of the various disposal techniques involved, and the uncertainty as to how one type of
waste will act in a different setting or respond to a different disposal technique, formulating a hazard-
ous waste site cleanup plan "is analogous to designing a complex chemical engineering process." Id.
at 10388.
5. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523.
6. This political pressure commonly is referred to as the "Not-In-My-Back-Yard" (NIMBY)
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dured the political pressure and sited a disposal facility within their borders the
recipients of a steady stream of hazardous waste.7 Understandably, many of
these states are increasingly unwilling to serve as "dumping grounds" for waste
produced by those states unwilling to take the responsibility for disposing of
their own hazardous byproducts. Through the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),8 Congress attempted to spur develop-
ment of increased disposal capacity nationwide by predicating a state's receipt of
remedial Superfund money on a state's showing that it will be able to dispose of
all hazardous waste generated within its borders during the next twenty years.9
Despite this incentive, some states remain content to export their hazardous
waste.
In National Solid Wastes Management Association and Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management,'0
(Chem Waste), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
viewed the constitutionality of an Alabama law banning the import of hazardous
waste from certain states.11 Relying almost exclusively on the United States
Supreme Court's prior ruling in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,12 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that the Alabama law violated the commerce clause of the
syndrome. See Crim, The NIMBY Syndrome in the 1990v" Where Do You Go After Getting to
"No"?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 132, 133 (May 4, 1990). North Carolina provides an example of the
fervor with which citizens may oppose hazardous waste disposal facilities. On June 25 and 26, 1990,
more than 300 protestors linked arms to stop surveyors from entering the two sites North Carolina
had proposed as a potential permanent home for a disposal facility. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 442 (July
6, 1990).
7. A May 8, 1990, EPA report addressed the waste importing and exporting habits of the
states in 1987. The study found that 33 states were net exporters of toxic waste in 1987, while only
17 were net importers. Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Michigan, and Indiana were the top five net
importers.
Ohio was both the largest importer of hazardous waste (91.6 million pounds), and the largest
exporter (82.7 million pounds).
Twenty-two states each exported more than ten million pounds of waste in 1987, with Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Mississippi ranking highest. Sixteen states imported more than ten
million pounds, with Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, and Michigan ranking highest.
Seven of the top ten exporting states were also among the top ten importing states-Ohio,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan.
About 30% of all hazardous waste produced was exported to other states.
This study examined toxic release data reported by U.S. manufacturers to EPA's Toxic Release
Inventory (TRI). The congressional Office of Technological Assessment has estimated that the total
wastes reported to TRI may be less than ten percent of all wastes actually discharged into the envi-
ronment. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 264 (May 25, 1990).
8. Pub. L. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (Oct. 17, 1986) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1988)). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)
amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA). Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (Dec. 11, 1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988)). See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(A) (1988).
10. 910 F.2d 713(llth Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Chem Waste]. On August 28, 1990, the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) filed a motion with the Eleventh Circuit for
rehearing en banc. Regardless of the resolution of that motion, the ultimate loser in the Eleventh
Circuit is expected to file a petition for writ of certiorari seeking Supreme Court review. Telephone
interview with Ronald Farley, General Counsel to ADEM, September 18, 1990.
11. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11(b) (1990).
12. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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United States Constitution.' 3 This Note analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's ap-
proach to the issue of the constitutionality of the Alabama statute and concludes
that the Eleventh Circuit erred both in finding the Alabama statute to be protec-
tionist legislation and in applying the rule of per se invalidity enunciated in City
of Philadelphia. The Note explores the dormant commerce clause principles
under which the Alabama law should have been analyzed and determines that
the Eleventh Circuit also erred by failing to apply a strict scrutiny standard of
review to the Alabama statute. The Note also examines the congressional legis-
lation upon which the Alabama law was based to determine if there was implied
congressional authorization for the Alabama action. The Note concludes that
the Alabama law is constitutional under both a strict scrutiny standard of review
and as a state regulation impliedly authorized by Congress.
Emelle, Alabama, a town of sixty-six inhabitants 14 located in west-central
Alabama near the Mississippi border,' 5 is home to the nation's largest, and Ala-
bama's only, commercial hazardous waste facility. 16 Owned and operated by
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., the Emelle facility has grown from ac-
cepting less than 200 million pounds of hazardous waste in 1978 to accepting an
estimated 1.6 billion pounds in 1989.17
In response to the growing perception that Alabama was becoming a
"dumping ground" for out-of-state hazardous waste producers, and in light of
SARA's capacity assurance requirements,18 the Alabama legislature enacted
13. The commerce clause states that Congress shall have the power "[to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
14. RAND MCNALLY COMMERCIAL ATLAS & MARKETING GUIDE 248 (119th ed. 1988). The
population figure is based on the 1980 census. Given that Emelle was so sparsely populated in 1980,
and that the town is home to the nation's largest hazardous waste incinerator, it is unlikely that the
community has experienced significant population growth over the last decade.
15. Id. at 138.
16. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 715.
17. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). These figures
include both domestically produced and imported hazardous waste. During 1987, Alabama indus-
tries shipped approximately 57,000 tons of hazardous waste out of state for disposal, while Alabama
imported approximately 500,000 tons of hazardous waste for treatment and disposal. Chem Waste,
910 F.2d at 717 n.6.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). The requirements are:
(9) Siting-Effective 3 years after October 17, 1986, the President shall not provide
any remedial actions pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release occurs
first enters into a contract or cooperative agreement with the President providing assur-
ances deemed adequate by the President that the State will assure the availability of haz-
ardous waste treatment or disposal facilities which-
(A) have adequate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition of all
hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected to be generated within the State during the
20-year period following the date of such contract or cooperative agreement and to be
disposed of, treated, or destroyed,
(B) are within the State or outside the State in accordance with an interstate agree-
ment or regional agreement or authority,
(C) are acceptable to the President, and
(D) are in compliance with the requirements of subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921].
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Alabama Code section 22-30-11,19 popularly called the "Holley Bill." 20 The
Holley Bill banned importation of shipments of hazardous waste 21 generated in
any state that (1) prohibits the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste within
its borders and has no facility for treatment or disposal of hazardous waste; or
(2) has no existing hazardous waste disposal facility, unless that state has en-
19. The Alabama House passed the legislation on April 26, 1989, and the Alabama Senate
passed the bill on May 4, 1989. Governor Guy Hunt signed the bill into law on May 11, 1989. The
act became effective 120 days after its passage, except for § 2(c) which became effective immediately
upon enactment. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Manage-
ment, 729 F. Supp. at 800 n.8., vacated, ChemWaste, 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990).
20. Named for the sponsoring state legislator, the Holley Bill states, in pertinent part:
(b) It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a commercial hazardous waste
treatment or disposal facility within this state to dispose or treat any hazardous wastes
generated in any state outside the state of Alabama which:
(1) Prohibits by law or regulation the treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes
within that state and which has no facility permitted or existing within that state for the
treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes; or
(2) Has no facility permitted or existing within that state for the treatment or disposal
of hazardous wastes; unless that state has entered into an interstate or regional agreement
for the safe disposal of hazardous wastes pursuant to the federal Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. The department shall establish and
maintain a list of states from which hazardous wastes cannot be accepted for treatment or
disposal pursuant to this paragraph and there shall be no liability under the paragraph for
disposal of wastes from a state until 15 days after a state has been listed by the department.
Such list shall be publicly available and set forth the reasons why each state is listed. The
date on which a state is included on such list shall be provided. The list of states shall be
revised monthly. The state of generation as shown on the hazardous waste manifest shall
be used in determining whether a person has treated or disposed of waste in violation of
this subsection, and any person who alters the state of generation on any manifest or mis-
represents the state of generation of any hazardous waste for the purpose of circumventing
this statute shall be punishable in accordance with section 33-30-19 herein.
(c) Subsequent to the effective date of Acts 1989, No. 89-788, no commercial hazardous
waste treatment or disposal facility operating in this state may contract with states other
than the state of Alabama in order to satisfy the capacity assurance programs required by
42 U.S.C § 9604(c)(9) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, as amended.
(d) For the purpose of this section, the following additional terms are defined:
(1) AGREEMENT. Any interstate or regional contract or agreement made pursuant
to capacity assurance requirements of Section 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) of CERCLA and
which one of the signatories to such contract or agreement is the state of Alabama.
(2) COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT OR DISPOSAL FA-
CILITY. A facility which receives for disposal only, or for treatment and disposal, haz-
ardous wastes that are not generated on-site and to which facility a fee is paid or other
consideration given for such treatment or disposal.
(4) REGION(AL). Region(al) shall mean any or all of the following states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, and Tennessee.
(5) STATE OF GENERATION. A state of the United States in which the hazardous
waste is generated in the form in which it is received by a commercial hazardous waste
treatment or disposal facility located in Alabama for treatment or disposal.
ALA. CODE § 22-30-11 (1990).
21. The bill applied only to the importation of landfiiled hazardous wastes. As Sue Robertson,
the Chief of ADEM's Land Division noted: "The ban is against disposal or landfilling of hazardous
waste.... [W]aste solvents from Florida are still allowed to come to Alabama to be burned or to go
through [a] recycling operation or solvent recovery.... [The Holley Bill] only bans ultimate dispo-
sal of hazardous waste." Brief for Appellees at 21 n.6, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
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tered into an interstate or regional agreement 22 for the safe disposal of hazard-
ous waste pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 23 The Holley Bill re-
quired Alabama to be a signatory to that agreement.24 The bill further pre-
vented any commercial waste management facilities in Alabama from
contracting with a state other than Alabama to satisfy the other state's capacity
assurance requirements mandated by CERCLA.25
Beginning September 13, 1989,26 Alabama issued a list of states the Holley
Bill barred from shipping hazardous waste into Alabama for disposal at the
Emelle facility.2 7 Required by law to be updated monthly,28 the original list
banned importation of hazardous waste from twenty-two states and the District
of Columbia.2 9 Prior to implementation of the Holley Bill, the Emelle facility
accepted hazardous waste from forty-eight states, with out-of-state waste com-
prising eighty-five percent of the waste disposed of at Emelle. 30
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (ChemWaste), along with the National
Solid Wastes Management Association, 31 filed a motion in federal district court
seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the Alabama Department of Envi-
ronmental Management (ADEM) from enforcing the Holley Bill.3 2
ChemWaste alleged that the bill violated the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 33 Converting the motion for a preliminary injunction into
simultaneous motions for summary judgment ex mero motu, the district court
22. Based on the language of SARA, such interstate or regional agreements are commonly
referred to as "compacts."
23. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 717.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The Holley Bill went into effect on this date. Id. at 718.
27. Id.
28. ALA. CODE § 22-30-11(b)(2) (1990).
29. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 718. The original "blacklist" issued September 13, 1989, included:
Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. United Press International,
August 30, 1989, Regional News.
An updated list issued in January 1990 included: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1622 (Jan. 1, 1990).
30. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 715. The bulk of the waste shipped to the Emelle facility came
from only a few states.
31. The National Solid Wastes Management Association is a trade association representing the
waste management industry. Id.
32. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792, 805 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, ChemWaste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). Leigh Pegues,
Director of ADEM, and Guy Hunt, Governor of Alabama, also were named as defendants in the
suit. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 715.
33. This Note will focus solely on the commerce clause challenge to the Holley Bill and the
court's opinion regarding that challenge. The court, however, also addressed other issues.
In addition to the commerce clause challenge, ChemWaste challenged Alabama regulations
requiring hazardous waste producers to receive the state's approval before shipping hazardous waste
to Alabama hazardous waste management facilities, and the requirement that certain hazardous
wastes be pretreated before disposal in Alabama. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 715.
The court invalidated the pre-approval regulations as an unconstitutional burden on interstate
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found the Alabama legislature's actions constitutional and granted summary
judgment in favor of ADEM.34
In upholding the statute, the district court found that the Holley Bill was
"directed toward a legitimate state concern." 35 The court stated that "[tihe ban
is directed toward protection of the health and welfare of the people and preser-
vation of the environment while encouraging compliance [by other states] with
the federal legislation." 36 The district court distinguished the Holley Bill from
the New Jersey law addressed by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia,
finding the Holley Bill's impact on interstate commerce to be incidental and not
excessive in relation to the local benefits. 37
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district
court's decision and entered summary judgment for ChemWaste. 38 In contrast
to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding
in City of Philadelphia with a nearly blind-hand and declared the Holley Bill a
per se violation39 of the commerce clause. Writing for a unanimous three-judge
panel, Judge Edmondson first concluded that hazardous waste is "commerce"
within the meaning of the commerce clause.4° Although it was not a contested
point in the case,4 1 the court drew upon this conclusion to find that "[a]lthough
the hazardous waste involved in this case may be innately more dangerous than
the solid and liquid waste involved in City of Philadelphia, we cannot say that
the dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate commerce." 42
commerce, and the court invalidated the pretreatment regulations as violations of the supremacy
clause, finding EPA regulations to preempt state regulations of this activity. Id. at 723.
Additionally, ChemWaste alleged that the Holley Bill violated the due process, takings, and
contract clauses of the Constitution. Neither the district court nor the circuit court addressed any of
these claims, and this Note likewise will not venture into these areas.
34. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (1990). In a memorandum opinion that
delves rather extensively into the history of congressional activity in the area of waste management
and regulation, the district court chose not to apply the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey to the Alabama law, distinguishing City of Philadelphia on the grounds that
unlike the New Jersey law in that case, the Alabama law did not prohibit importation of all hazard-
ous waste. Finding the ban "directed toward protection of the health and welfare of the people and
preservation of the environment while encouraging compliance with federal legislation," the district
court found that the act's "impact on interstate commerce is incidental and not excessive in relation
to the local benefits," and thus concluded that the legislation is constitutional. 729 F. Supp. at 804.
35. NationalSolid Wastes Management Ass'n, 729 F. Supp. at 804, vacated, Chem Waste, 910 S.
Ct. 713 (1990).
36. Id. The court also found that the bill was designed to allow Alabama to comply with the
CERCLA capacity assurance requirements.
37. Id. The district court found the 1.6 billion pounds of waste buried at Emelle comprised
"less than three-tenths of one percent of America's toxic waste." Id. at 797. The district court noted
that "[slome of this percentage comes from states that have complied with federal legislation....
The court, therefore, is being asked to decide whether a partial ban on less than three-tenths of one
percent is an onerous burden on interstate commerce." Id. at 797 n.7.
38. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 725.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 95-98.
40. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 718-19.
41. Alabama never argued that hazardous waste does not constitute "commerce." In fact, City
of Philadelphia makes it clear that "[a]ll objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protec-
tion; none is excluded by definition at the outset." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
622 (1978).
42. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 719. The court noted that
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The court recognized Supreme Court precedent allowing a state to prohibit
transportation of an object across state lines "when the dangers inhering in an
object's movement 'far outweigh' its worth in interstate commerce." 43 The
court also cited Supreme Court decisions addressing state attempts to "restrict
interstate movement of an object when, on account of the object's existing condi-
tion, [it] would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death" 44 as examples
of such an allowable burden on interstate commerce. Noting that a "compre-
hensive scheme for regulating the management of hazardous waste" 4 5 has devel-
oped through federal and state legislation, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the "dangers associated with hazardous waste movement do not outweigh the
value of moving hazardous waste across state lines."" s
In finding the Holley Bill to be an unconstitutional barrier to interstate
commerce, the court of appeals rejected ADEM's argument that the Alabama
legislature intended that the Holley Bill protect the health and safety of the
state's citizens and its environment.47 The court noted that Alabama "did not
ban the shipment of all hazardous wastes into the state, but only shipments from
certain states."'48 Quoting from City of Philadelphia, the court determined that
even if the impetus for the Holley Bill was the protection of human and environ-
mental health, Alabama may not accomplish that purpose by "'discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.' "49 With unques-
tioned certainty the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[t]he Holley Bill plainly
distinguishes among wastes based on their origin, with no other basis for the
distinction." 50
In concluding its opinion on the commerce clause question, the Eleventh
Circuit found no express or implied congressional authorization for the Ala-
"Et]he Supreme Court never described the waste at issue in City of Philadelphia as 'hazard-
ous'; the Court [in City of Philadelphia] was apparently considering 'solid waste,' defined
by Congress as: 'any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commer-
cial, mining, and agriculture operations, and from community activities.'"
Id. at 719 n.9 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 718 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622).
44. Id. (citing Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888) (striking down state
prohibition on interstate movement of liquor)); see also Clason v. Indiana, 306 US. 439, 442 (1939)
(upholding Indiana's prohibition against interstate transportation of large dead animals because "ob-
vious purpose of the enactment [was] to prevent the spread of disease and the development of
nuisances.").
45. 910 F.2d at 719.
46. Id.
47. See infra note 127 (listing the legislative findings that preface the legislation).
48. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 720. This is a rather curious conclusion given that a total ban on
importation of hazardous waste would be a clear violation of the commerce clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 150-51. Additionally, such a ban would prevent Alabama from meeting its
capacity assurance requirement as mandated by Congress through SARA. The court itself had
noted earlier that most states will need to enter into compact agreements with other states "because
most states lack the capacity to dispose of all types of hazardous wastes within their borders."
Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 717.
49. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 720 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27).
50. Id.
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bama law.5I The court recognized the long-held principle that actions specifi-
cally authorized by Congress are not subject to commerce clause restrictions,
and quoted the Supreme Court's requirement that "[s]uch congressional intent
or authorization for states to affect interstate commerce ... must be 'expressly
stated' and 'unmistakably clear.' "52 The court held that "nothing in SARA
evidences congressional authorization for each state to close its borders to
wastes generated in other states,"' 53 thereby refusing to find the Holley Bill to be
a constitutionally valid manifestation of congressional will.
Any court today that addresses a commerce clause question faces a myriad
of uncertainties. The court can find select Supreme Court opinions which seem-
ingly will justify any resulting decision. The commerce clause grants to Con-
gress the power to "regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes."'54 "'Although the [Commerce]
Clause thus speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court long
has recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against
interstate trade.' -55 This limit on the power of the states to regulate interstate
commerce is known as the "negative" or "dormant" aspect of the commerce
clause. Since 1849 the United States Supreme Court has applied the dormant
commerce clause to invalidate state statutes deemed inappropriate burdens on
interstate commerce.5 6
51. Id. at 721.
52. Id. (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)); see also
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1983) (city's
requirement that local labor do certain percentage of work on public construction projects did not
violate commerce clause).
53. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. B.T. Investment Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)).
56. See, eg., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); see
also Note, The Market Participant Test in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis--Protecting Protec-
tionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 699 n.15 (giving a brief historical overview of the Supreme Court's
early treatment of the dormant commerce clause).
The Supreme Court has relied on the dormant commerce clause to strike down a
broad array of state laws, such as a state reciprocity requirement for the export of ground
water, a state restriction on the export of hydroelectric power, a state franchise-tax credit
for domestic, international-sales corporations, a state wholesale gross-receipts tax that ex-
empted local manufacturers, a state liquor tax that excluded certain locally produced alco-
holic beverages, a state law requiring that timber taken from state lands be processed
within the state prior to export, a state lower-price affirmation law for certain alcoholic
beverages, and a state marker fee and axle tax discriminatorily imposed on out-of-state
trucks.
Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in its First Century, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV.
417, 418 (1988).
Professor Regan has identified the "movement-of-goods" cases that he cites as the central line of
dormant commerce clause cases in the modem era. Those cases are: Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Exxon
Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333 (1977); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1986).
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During more than a century of jurisprudence on the subject,5 7 the Supreme
Court has applied the dormant commerce clause in a chaotic and confused fash-
ion.58 Despite such uncertainties, modem dormant commerce clause opinions
suggest that state regulatory statutes face a two-tiered analysis. 59
The first tier of analysis addresses state statutes that on their face, in pur-
pose, or in effect, discriminate against interstate commerce. These state regula-
tory statutes are subject to a "strict scrutiny" test, meaning the court will uphold
them only if the state establishes (1) a legitimate state interest in the regulation,
and (2) that the means adopted are the least discriminatory option available. 60
The Supreme Court fully stated the core of the strict scrutiny test in Maine v.
Taylor,61 and later reiterated it in New Energy Company v. Limbach,62 in which
57. The origins of recognition of the dormant commerce clause can be found as far back as
Chief Justice Marshall's opinions in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and Wilson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). However, the doctrine did not become
established fully in Supreme Court jurisprudence until the decision in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See Redish & Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 576-77.
58. Two of the most notable critics are Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Justice
Scalia has said,
The fact is that the 114 years since the doctrine of the negative Commerce Clause was
formally adopted as a holding of this Court, and in the 50 years prior to that in which it
was alluded to in various dicta of the Court our applications of the doctrine have, not to
put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
Less than pleased with the majority's decision invalidating an Iowa statute prohibiting the use
of certain large trucks within the state as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, Justice
Rehnquist lamented, "We know only that Iowa's law is invalid and that the jurisprudence of the
'negative side' of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused." Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Criticism is not limited to the Court's most recent decisions. In 1946 Justice Rutledge noted
that the commerce clause "is not the simple, clean-cutting tool supposed.... [I]ts implied negative
operation on state power has been uneven, at times highly variable.... [Tihe history of the com-
merce clause has been one of very considerable judicial oscillation." Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408, 418, 420 (1946).
59. Kalen, supra note 56, at 417.
60. Id. at 417-18. The leading case stating this application of the dormant commerce clause is
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), in which the Supreme Court, in upholding a state ban on the
importation of live bait fish, held:
The limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory power "is by no
means absolute," and "the States retain authority under their general police powers to
regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern,' even though interstate commerce may be
affected." In determining whether a State has overstepped its role in regulating interstate
commerce, this Court has distinguished between state statutes that burden interstate trans-
actions only incidentally, and those that affirmatively discriminate against such transac-
tions. While statutes in the first group violate the Commerce Clause only if the burdens
they impose on interstate trade are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits," statutes in the second group are subject to more demanding scrutiny. The Court
explained in Hughes v. Oklahoma, that once a state law is shown to discriminate against
interstate commerce "either on its face or in practical effect," the burden falls on the State
to demonstrate both that the statute "serves a legitimate local purpose," and that this
purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.
Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
61. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
62, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). In Limbach, the Court invalidated on commerce clause grounds an
Ohio statute that awarded a sales tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold by dealers if the ethanol
was produced in Ohio or in a state that had a similar sales tax credit provision. Id. at 274.
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the Court noted that "state statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate
commerce are routinely struck down, unless the discrimination is demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism. '63
The strict scrutiny test must be viewed in light of the Supreme Court's
statement that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legisla-
tion, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected." 64 Any state regula-
tion that clearly is protectionist in nature, with its purpose being to favor local
economic interests at the expense of foreign interests, likely will be struck down
as per se invalid under the commerce clause. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
leaves open the possibility of a legitimate local purpose driving such legislation,
and when such a state interest exists, and that interest is sufficiently compelling,
the Court will uphold the legislation if it passes the strict scrutiny standard of
review.65
The second tier of commerce clause analysis reviews state statutes under
what commonly is referred to as the Pike v. Bruce Church 66 balancing test. In
Pike v. Bruce Church the Supreme Court established that when a state statute
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits."'67
A court ordinarily will conclude its inquiry if a state law fails to pass either
of these commerce clause tests. However, a state's contention that Congress has
authorized the state to regulate interstate commerce in a particular manner pro-
vides the state with "another string to [its] bow."' 68 The Supreme Court long
has recognized the commerce clause to be an affirmative grant of power to Con-
63. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
64. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
65. See Note, supra note 56, at 703 n.31 (arguing that the qualification of the wording of the per
se rule leaves the door open for states to pass quarantine laws). Other commentators, however, see
the qualification of the per se invalidity rule as leaving the door open for the application of the
balancing test under circumstances apart from quarantine cases. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92
HARV. L. Rlv. 57, 62 (1978).
66. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. involved a challenge to a provision of the
Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization Act requiring that cantaloupes grown in Arizona and
offered for sale meet certain packaging requirements before the cantaloupes could be shipped out of
the state. Id. at 138. Finding only a minimal state interest in the regulations, the Supreme Court
invalidated the Arizona law as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 146.
67. Id. at 142. The full text of the Pike v. Bruce Church test as set forth by the Supreme Court
reads:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting interstate com-
merce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.
Id. (citation omitted).
68. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980).
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gress, as well as a negative limitation on states.69 This means that Congress may
authorize the states to regulate interstate commerce in ways that would other-
wise be unconstitutional under dormant commerce clause principles. 70 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to find congressional authorization
for state action absent an unmistakably clear expression of congressional
intent.7 1
Congress entered the field of hazardous waste regulation7 2 with the passage
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).73 One of the
main goals of RCRA is to establish a "cradle to grave" system for regulating
hazardous waste.74 The federal government administers the system unless a
state chooses to handle those duties itself.7" RCRA requires the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) "to establish minimum federal standards applicable to
all who generate, . . . transport, . . . treat, store or dispose ... of hazardous
wastes."17 6 A state must follow these minimum standards if it chooses to admin-
ister its own hazardous waste program. 77
Unfortunately, even after the passage of RCRA, the nation's hazardous
waste disposal problems continued to multiply, and "[i]n recognition of the
tragic consequences of improper, negligent, and reckless hazardous waste dispo-
sal practices,"'78 and in response to the tremendous public awareness and con-
cern generated by such environmental debacles as Love Canal, 79 Congress
69. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
70. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648 (1981); South Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
71. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984) ("There is no
talismanic significance to the phrase 'expressly stated,' however; it merely states one way of meeting
the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce
Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear."); see also infra notes 193-94 and accompa-
nying text (discussing how Congress can meet this standard).
72. Congress first addressed solid waste disposal by passing the Solid Waste Disposal Act of
1965. Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (Supp. V 1965). This Act
provided state and local governments with the means to plan and develop waste disposal programs.
42 U.S.C. § 3255.
The Resource Recovery Act of 1970 amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, and estab-
lished the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which took over the functions of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare's Bureau of Solid Waste Management. Reorg. Plan No. 3
of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970).
This is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of federal legislation in the hazardous waste
area. For a more in-depth account see Note, The Political Economy of Superfund Implementation,
59 S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1986).
73. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792, 793-94 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir 1990).
74. Id. at 794.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 794-95.
78. Note, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Limiting Judicial Review
to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the EPA, 74 CORNELL L. RaV. 1152, 1155
(1989).
79. See Note, supra note 72, at 877. The Hooker Chemical Company and the City of Niagara
Falls used the Love Canal as a disposal site from around 1930 until 1953; the Canal was then coy-
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enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA)8 0 in December of 1980. Popularly known as the
"Superfund," because of the $1.6 billion "Hazardous Substance Response Trust
Fund" 8 1 it established,82 CERCLA's main purpose is to protect public health
and the environment by providing federal monetary assistance for the cleanup of
leaking hazardous waste disposal sites.8 3 Congress's failure to comprehend fully
the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem 84 combined with improper polit-
ical conduct by EPA officials in the hazardous waste division 5 made CERCLA
an ineffective means for achieving congressional ends. In an attempt to correct
CERCLA's shortcomings, Congress adopted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).8 6
In addition to providing the EPA with much needed funds to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites, 87 SARA attempts to ensure that safe and adequate disposal
facilities will be developed in the future. SARA requires each state to demon-
strate its ability to dispose of all hazardous waste generated within its borders
over the next twenty years.88 A state may meet this "capacity assurance re-
quirement" either by developing sufficient hazardous waste treatment capacity
ered with earth, and more than 100 homes and an elementary school were built on or near the site.
In 1976, unusually heavy rains raised the water table and brought chemical wastes closer to the
surface. As a result, a serious health risk arose from toxic chemical leachate in the basements of area
homes. President Carter declared Love Canal a disaster area in 1978. Florini, Issues of Federallsm
In Hazardous Waste Control: Cooperation or Confusion?, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L, REV. 307, 326 n.151
(1982) (citations omitted). The legislative history accompanying CERCLA makes express reference
to the incidents at Love Canal. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 19-20 (1980).
80. Pub. L. No. 95-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).
81. The Superfund provisions originally were codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9631, but were repealed
effective January 1, 1987. Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. V, § 517 (c)(1), 100 Stat. 1774 (1986). The
Superfund provisions now are codified as part of the I.R.S. code at 26 U.S.C § 9507 (1988).
82. As initially enacted, the Superfund was to be financed primarily by a tax on petroleum
products and petrochemical feedstocks, with additional funds coming from general revenues. The
tax provided 87.5% of the fund's revenue, with the remaining 12.5% to come from the general
treasury. The legislation provided that the taxes could not be collected after September 30, 1985.
Florini, supra note 79, at 320 n.l 16.
83. National Solid Wastes Management v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F. Supp.
792, 796 (N.D. Ala.) (citation omitted), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (1990).
84. In 1979, prior to the passage of CERCLA, both the EPA and Congress believed that a
site could be adequately cleaned up by "scraping a few inches of soil off the ground." At
the time, the EPA estimated that between 1,200 and 2,000 sites posed a serious risk to
public health. The EPA also estimated that it needed between S13.1 and $22.1 billion to
clean up all of these dangerous hazardous waste sites .... By 1985, however, approximately
10,000 sites required cleanup.
Note, supra note 78, at 1155-56 (citations omitted). The estimates regarding the cost of such cleanup
ran as high as $100 billion. 'Id.
85. Congressional investigations of EPA discovered that certain EPA officials had diverted
cleanup funds from Superfund sites "in order to increase the political fortunes of Republican Senate
candidates." Id. These discoveries led to the eventual resignation of Anne Burford, the EPA Ad-
ministrator; the imprisonment of Rita Lavelle, the EPA's top hazardous waste official; and the resig-
nation of more than 20 senior EPA officials. Id. at 1157 n.39 (citations omitted).
86. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(1988)).
87. SARA provides EPA with $8.5 billion over a five-year span to clean up inoperative waste
sites. 42 U.S.C. § 9611. This sum is still grossly insufficient to cover the estimated $100 billion it
will take to complete the Superfund's objectives. H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 55 (1988).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(A) (1988).
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of its own, or by entering into an interstate or regional agreement with other
states to share the burden of hazardous waste disposal.89 If a state fails to pro-
vide adequate capacity assurances, the EPA has the authority to deny that state
remedial clean-up monies from Superfund. 9°
The principal Supreme Court decision addressing the commerce clause im-
plications of waste disposal is City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.9 1 In City of
Philadelphia, the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey statute prohibiting
the importation of most solid or liquid waste that originated or was collected
outside the territorial limits of New Jersey. The primary purpose of the New
Jersey law was to preserve the state's dwindling landfill space. The Court held
that the New Jersey law was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce
and, thus, violative of the dormant commerce clause.92 Rejecting New Jersey's
argument that the ban was intended to preserve existing landfill space in an
attempt to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the state's citizens, the
Supreme Court declared, "the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends.... [W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose,
it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce com-
ing from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
89. Id. § 9604(c)(9)(B). Even those states that have hazardous waste disposal facilities likely
will have to enter regional disposal agreements because no state has the ability to dispose of all the
different types of hazardous waste produced, and SARA requires that a state have disposal capacity
for all waste.
90. Id. Funds may be withheld only for remedial measures. Superfund money for emergency
cleanups is still available to states that fail to provide capacity assurances.
91. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). As one lower federal court has said, "any discussion of the constitu-
tionality of a state statute that effectively bans the disposal of out-of-state waste must begin with an
analysis of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey." Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1207-
08 (D.R.I. 1987).
92. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
The contested New Jersey statute in pertinent part read:
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was
collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine in the
State of New Jersey, until the commissioner [of the state Department of Environmental
Protection] shall determine that such action can be permitted without endangering the
public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulat-
ing the treatment and disposal of such waste in the State.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West Supp. 1978).
Pursuant to his authority under this statute, the Commissioner issued regulations permitting
four categories of waste to enter the State. No other waste from other states was allowed to enter
New Jersey. The four exceptions were:
(1) Garbage to be fed to swine in the state of New Jersey;
(2) Any separated waste material, including newsprint, paper, glass and metals, that is
free from putrescible materials and not mixed with other solid or liquid waste that is in-
tended for a recycling or reclamation facility;
(3) Municipal solid waste to be separated or processed into usable secondary materi-
als, including fuel and heat, at a resource recovery facility provided that not less than 70
percent of the thru-put of any such facility is to be separated or processed into usable
secondary materials; and
(4) Pesticides, hazardous wastes, chemical waste, bulk liquid, bulk semiliquid, which
is to be treated, processed or recovered in a solid waste disposal facility which is registered
with the Department for such treatment, processing or recovery, other than by disposal on
or in the lands of this State.
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618-20 nn.l-2 (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 1-4.2 (Supp.
1977)).
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treat them differently."193 The Court determined that New Jersey's landfill space
was a natural resource and that the state "may not accord its own inhabitants a
preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources
located within its borders."' 94 The Supreme Court, in invalidating the New
Jersey legislation, established a rule of virtual per se invalidity for certain com-
merce clause questions:
[T]he ultimate principle [is] that one state in its dealings with an-
other may not place itself in a position of economic isolation ...
[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation,
a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. The clearest ex-
ample of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of inter-
state commerce at the state's borders. But where other legislative
objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination
against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible
approach, the general contours of which are outlined in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.9"
It is against the backdrop of the City of Philadelphia decision that the Elev-
enth Circuit decided Chem Waste. As is necessary in dormant commerce clause
analysis, the Chem Waste court first addressed whether the Holley Bill erected a
barrier to interstate commerce that violated the City of Philadelphia test of per
se invalidity.
The Chem Waste court framed the "crucial inquiry" 96 presented by this test
to be "whether the Holley Bill is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it
is based on legitimate local concerns with effects on interstate commerce that are
only incidental."' 97 The Chem Waste court found the Holley Bill protectionist in
nature and, thus, per se invalid under City of Philadelphia.98 The court reached
this conclusion by finding that: (1) the Holley Bill was not required for Ala-
bama to comply with SARA's capacity assurance requirements; (2) the bill
placed the total burden of conserving Alabama's remaining hazardous waste dis-
posal capacity on out-of-state generators; and (3) the failure of the Alabama
legislature to ban all out-of-state hazardous waste from entering the state
amounted to nothing more than distinguishing hazardous waste based solely on
93. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
94. Id. at 627.
95. Id. at 624.
96. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 720.
97. Id.
98. The district court, upon finding the Holley Bill to regulate evenhandedly and to be based on
legitimate local concerns, had applied the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test in finding the bill
constitutional. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management,
729 F. Supp. 792, 804-05 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990).
City of Philadelphia speaks in terms of "economic" protectionism, but it seems that the Court is
warning against other types of protectionism as well. One scholar has said that a state statute (or
regulation, or local ordinance, etc.) should be labeled protectionist if and only if:
(a) the statute (or whatever) was adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive
position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are local, vis-a-vis their for-
eign ... competitors; and (b) the statute (or whatever) is analogous in form to the tradi-
tional instruments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo.
Regan, supra note 56, at 1094-95.
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its state of origin.99 In reaching its protectionist determination, the Eleventh
Circuit failed to see several major distinctions between the New Jersey law
struck down in City of Philadelphia and the Alabama law in question here. The
first major distinction concerns the ChemWaste court's conclusion that "[tihe
Holley Bill plainly distinguishes among wastes based on their origin, with no
other basis for the distinction." 100 This conclusion ignores the fundamental
character of each piece of legislation. The New Jersey law invalidated in City of
Philadelphia banned all out-of-state waste from entering New Jersey, and
thereby distinguished waste based solely on its state of origin. In contrast, the
Holley Bill did not distinguish waste solely on the basis of its state of origin.
Rather, any state would be welcome to use the facility if that stat met federal
guidelines and was willing to join a compact with Alabama. The Holley Bill's
distinctions are made upon a state's willingness to comply with the express pol-
icy and statutory objectives as forwarded by Congress through SARA. Unlike
the New Jersey law in City of Philadelphia, the Alabama law banned hazardous
waste only from states that chose to avoid taking responsibility for disposal of
their own hazardous waste. This distinction is demonstrated effectively by the
provision in the Holley Bill requiring a monthly update of the list of states pro-
hibited from shipping waste to Alabama. 10 1 That provision allows any state
which chooses both to provide disposal facilities within its borders (or otherwise
comply with SARA) and to join an interstate compact with Alabama to ship
hazardous waste to Emelle.
Indeed, in City of Philadelphia the Supreme Court stated that "whatever [a
state's] ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apartfirom their origin, to treat them differently." 10 2 Congress placed the bur-
den on each state to demonstrate its ability to dispose of all hazardous waste
produced within its borders over the next twenty years; Alabama's distinctions
are based on state boundaries only to the extent that Congress chose to make
states the entities responsible for compliance. It is compliance with federal
guidelines, not state of origin, that drives Alabama's decisions as to whether or
not to accept wastes.
The second major distinction concerns the Eleventh Circuit's finding that
the Holley Bill is protectionist because it "discriminates among out-of-state gen-
erators and imposes on these generators the burden of conserving Alabama's
remaining hazardous waste disposal capacity." 10 3 The court's language is
drawn from a near-verbatim expression used by the Supreme Court in City of
Philadelphia.104 The Chem Waste court determined that the Holley Bill was an
99. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 720.
100. Id.
101. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792, 800 (N.D. Ala. 1990), vacated, Chem Waste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). See supra
notes 28-29.
102. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) (emphasis added).
103. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 720.
104. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628 ("The New Jersey law... imposes on out-of-state
commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space.").
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attempt by Alabama to hoard its disposal capacity.10 5 Again quoting City of
Philadelphia, the court held that through the legislation Alabama sought to
"'isolate itself from a problem common to many by erecting a barrier against
the movement of interstate trade.' ,,106 Contrary to the court's conclusion, how-
ever, Alabama showed no signs of attempting to hoard its disposal capacity.
Alabama designed the Holley Bill so that conceivably every state could enter an
agreement with Alabama to use the Emelle facility. 10 7 In contrast, the New
Jersey law in City of Philadelphia had the avowed goal of conserving the "dimin-
ished"' 10 8 landfill capacity in that state by banning all out-of-state waste.
In striking down the New Jersey law in City of Philadelphia the Supreme
Court held that "a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of
access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its
borders,"' 0 9 thus refusing New Jersey the right to "isolate itself from a problem
common to many."' 10 The Supreme Court concluded that the landfill space in
New Jersey constituted a natural resource. 11 In contrast, Alabama did not seek
to give its citizens a "preferred right of access,"'1 12 nor to "isolate itself from a
problem common to many."" 3 Alabama sought only to control the disposal
capacity within the state to comply with the capacity assurance requirements of
SARA. If an exporting state seeks to fulfill its capacity assurance requirement
by entering into a compact agreement with another state, the importing state
(Alabama) must agree to allocate disposal capacity to the exporting state.
In Chem Waste the Eleventh Circuit determined that "SARA places the
burden of making capacity assurances ... on the [hazardous waste] generating
state."11 4 In reaching this conclusion the court failed to realize that the only
way for an exporting state to meet its capacity assurance requirement through
an interstate agreement is for the importing state to allocate part of the disposal
capacity within its borders to the exporting state. 1 5 An interstate agreement is
worth little more than the paper on which it is written if the importing state
cannot control its disposal capacity to guarantee the exporting state that its
waste will not be turned away because a noncompact state has used all the avail-
able disposal capacity. As Senator Chaffee noted during legislative debate over
SARA, "[m]erely having a plan on paper is insufficient. There must be reason to
believe that the assurances are real, that the plan will work." ' 1 6 Contrary to the
court's analysis, the Holley Bill functioned merely to allow Alabama to allocate
105. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 720.
106. Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628).
107. See supra note 20 (text of Holley Bill).
108. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625.
109. Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 628.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 627.
113. Id. at 628.
114. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721.
115. Alabama unsuccessfully made this argument in its brief to the Eleventh Circuit. Brief of
Appellees at 15, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
116. 132 CONG. REC. S14924 (daily ed. Oct 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chaffee).
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its disposal capacity in the manner implicitly prescribed by Congress, not to
"hoard" its disposal capacity to the detriment of all others.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit's Chem Waste conclusion that Alabama
sought to isolate itself from the rest of the hazardous waste world is difficult to
understand in light of the fact that Alabama has entered a regional agreement to
accept waste from other states. 117 Alabama participates in the exact type of
regional disposal plan Congress envisioned in passing SARA-a regional dispo-
sal plan that opens Alabama's hazardous disposal facilities to states that enter an
agreement with Alabama. Moreover, the Chem Waste court's conclusion that
Alabama sought to isolate itself is questionable given that the original list of
states banned from shipping waste to Alabama included only twenty-two
states.118 Alabama's willingness to a6cept waste from the twenty-seven remain-
ing states, a majority of the states in the union, hardly rises to the level of "isola-
tionist" behavior.
The Alabama law differs significantly in both purpose and effect from the
New Jersey law struck down by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia.
Although City of Philadelphia was the appropriate starting point for analysis,
the Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize the crucial distinctions that prevent the
dormant commerce clause principles set forth in City of Philadelphia from strik-
ing down the Holley Bill as per se invalid economic protectionist legislation. 19
117. The court noted that Alabama entered a regional agreement with Kentucky, South Caro-
lina, and Tennessee. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 717 n.5. The necessity of such agreements stems from
the inability of states to dispose of all the differing types of hazardous waste generated within their
borders.
118. Id. at 718.
119. The Chem Waste court's application of the City of Philadelphia decision is also not in keep-
ing with the Supreme Court's subsequent uses of that same decision. The Chem Waste court seems to
apply the City of Philadelphia decision much more rigidly than does the Supreme Court itself.
The Supreme Court has cited the City of Philadelphia opinion in 18 subsequent decisions. See
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) ("[W]hat may appear to be a 'discriminatory'
provision in the constitutionally prohibited sense-that is, a protectionist enactment-may on closer
analysis not be so. However it be put, the standards for such justification are high." (citing City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87
(1987) ("The principle objects of dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce."); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) ("[Sltate laws that
amount to 'simple economic protectionism' consequently have been subject to a 'virtually per se rule
of invalidity.' ") (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) ("When a state statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.");
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("Where simple economic protectionism is
effected by state legislation, a stricter rule of invalidity has been erected."); South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984) (applying the virtual per se invalidity rule to an
Alaska law requiring trees cut from state land to be processed within the state); Idaho ex reL Evans
v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983) ("a State may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants
natural resources located within its borders"); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 394 (1983) (comparing City of Philadelphia with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery, 449 U.S. 456 (1980), to show an example of economic protectionism); White v. Massa-
chusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 224 (1983) (Blackmun, I., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Protectionist measures are "subject to the rule of virtually per se inva-
lidity established by many of this Court's cases."); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S.
941, 953 (1982) (finding Nebraska groundwater to be an object of commerce); New England Power
Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 338 (1982) (A "State is without power to prevent privately
owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they
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The ChemWaste court's conclusion that the "Holley Bill discriminates
against interstate commerce" 120 was based on the erroneous assumption that the
law was in essence nothing more than economic protectionism ineffectively dis-
guised as environmental protection legislation. With this erroneous assumption
in mind, the Eleventh Circuit relied solely on the City of Philadelphia test to
analyze the Holley Bill.121 The court perceived its choice to be between finding
the legislation per se invalid or applying the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing
test 122 intended for analysis of state statutes that regulate "evenhandedly."' 123
By narrowing the focus to a choice between the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing
test or the per se invalidity rule, however, the Chem Waste court completely ig-
nored the strict scrutiny standard of review. The strict scrutiny test is the stan-
dard of review that the Supreme Court applies to state laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce but are enacted to effect a legitimate local con-
cern.I24 Application of the "strict scrutiny" standard of review would have
alleviated any need for the ChemWaste court to address the Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing test, because any state law that can withstand strict scrutiny
under dormant commerce clause analysis likewise will pass the more lenient
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test. By failing to apply the strict scrutiny stan-
dard and analyze the Holley Bill under its guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit
struck down a constitutionally sound piece of legislation.
The strict scrutiny standard of review applies two questions to a challenged
state law: (1) does the statute serve a legitimate and compelling state interest;
and (2) could this purpose be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.125 In concluding that the Pike v. Bruce Church test should not be ap-
plied to the Holley Bill, the Eleventh Circuit gave only brief consideration to
Alabama's avowed local purposes for the statute. The appellate court, however,
should have taken a closer look at this first prong of the "strict scrutiny" test,
are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State") (citation
omitted)); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 618 (1981) (citing City of Philadel-
phia as a "discrimination" case); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 652 (1981) ("Even in the absence of congressional action, the courts may decide whether state
regulations challenged under the Commerce Clause impermissibly burden interstate commerce.");
Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 686 (1981) (noting that the Court has
condemned "simple... protectionism" in the economic area); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) ("If a state law purporting to promote environmental purposes is in
reality 'simple economic protectionism,' we have applied a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity.' ")
(quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 (1980)(finding cement, unlike New Jersey landfill space, not a natural resource); Lewis v. BT Inv. Manag-
ers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (citing City of Philadelphia as an example of a case applying dor-
mant commerce clause principles); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (state regulation
that "'overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's borders'" is discriminatory
(quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624)).
120. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721.
121. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 67.
123. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 720.
124. National Solid Wastes Management, while arguing that it should not apply in this case,
recognized the strict scrutiny test in its brief to the Eleventh Circuit. See Brief of Appellants at 10,
Chem Waste (No. 90-7047). Apparently agreeing with appellant's argument, the Eleventh Circuit
never addressed this test in its decision.
125. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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Alabama argued that it passed the Holley Bill with two local purposes in
mind: to allow the state to comply with the capacity assurance requirements of
SARA and to protect public health, safety and welfare. 126 The legislative find-
ings that prefaced the Holley Bill offered the same justifications. 127 In
Chem Waste, however, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Holley Bill had
126. Brief of Appellees at 16, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
127. The legislative findings that prefaced the Holley Bill read:
Sec. 1. The legislature finds that:
(1) The generation, management, and disposal of hazardous wastes is a cause of con-
tinuing concern to the citizens of this state;
(2) The State of Alabama has a responsibility to protect the public health, welfare, and
safety of its citizens by and through the enactment of laws designed to protect and preserve
the environment from the health risks and endangerments associated with the treatment
and disposal of hazardous wastes;
(3) The United States Congress, recognizing the serious health threats and risks posed
by the treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes to public health and the environment,
enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") 42 U.S.C. 9604(c)(9), as amended, which requires that each state by October
17, 1989, that is [sic] has adequate capacity to treat, destroy, or secure disposition of all
hazardous waste reasonably expected to be generated within the state over the next 20
years through the establishment of a hazardous waste treatment or disposal facility located
within its borders, or through the use of a hazardous waste treatment or disposal facility
located outside the state in accordance with an interstate agreement or regional agreement
authority;
(4) In enacting the capacity assurance requirements, Congress recognized that local
pressures have impeded the siting of new hazardous waste treatment and disposal in the
nation in the past several years, and if the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act as amended ("RCRA") and CERCLA are to work properly, such additional sites
must be made available. Since Alabama is already bearing far more than its fair share of
the burden of managing hazardous wastes, it is only equitable that new capacity be devel-
oped in other states which have failed to assume their own obligations to sister such facili-
ties.
(5) Both Congress and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency have recognized
that the capacity assurance provisions of CERCLA would be used to force the develop-
ment of new capacity to manage hazardous wastes. Implicit in the CERCLA capacity-
assurance procedure is a recognition that an importing state might refuse to enter into an
agreement with an exporting state, requiring the exporting state to create available capacity
through waste reduction or through siting new facilities, or enter into an agreement with
another state to manage these wastes;
(6) The State of Alabama has enacted and implemented an approved program for the
handling and disposal of hazardous wastes within its borders, known as the "Hazardous
Waste Management and Minimization Act," and has established regulations and guide-
lines for the treatment, storage, and disposal of all hazardous wastes generated within the
state, and continues to evaluate and update those regulations and guidelines;
(7) The State of Alabama, since 1978, has had an adequate capacity for the destruc-
tion, treatment, or secure disposition of all hazardous wastes that are reasonably expected
to be generated within the state over the next 20 years through their establishment and
continued existence of commercial hazardous waste facilities within the state;
(8) The State of Alabama has, since 1978, accepted for treatment and disposal, dispro-
portionate amounts of hazardous wastes generated within the borders of other states which
have not taken steps to provide the assurance required by 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9);
(9) The constant influx of large volumes of hazardous wastes entering this state over
and through congested state, county, and municipal highways and roads, coupled with the
ever-increasing potential for traffic accidents and mishaps involving hazardous waste trans-
porters and the likelihood of leaks, spills, and/or explosions of said hazardous wastes re-
sulting therefrom, altogether pose an unreasonable and unjustifiable risk to the health,
safety, and welfare of Alabama's citizens;
(10) The State of Alabama lacks the financial resources and trained personnel neces-
sary to cope with the serious dangers and risks associated with the transportation within
this state of the ever-increasing volumes of hazardous wastes generated out of state, and, as
1991) 1019
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
no direct connection to Alabama's ability to participate fully in and comply
completely with the SARA capacity assurance requirements. 128 Noting that
SARA provides the state with three options for satisfying its capacity assurance
requirement, 129 the court surmised that "[i]f Alabama's capacity assurance plan
depends on capacity provided by a commercial, privately owned management
facility such as Emelle, the state should contract with the private facility for
that capacity, instead of blocking the private facility from accepting wastes from
other states." 130
The Eleventh Circuit adopted ChemWaste's argument that the capacity as-
surance requirements of SARA place the burden on the exporting state to prove
to the EPA that it can accommodate adequately all the hazardous waste pro-
duced within its borders in the next twenty years.131 Extrapolating this argu-
ment a bit further, one can conclude only that while Congress has expressly
authorized the states to enter regional interstate agreements for the disposal of
hazardous waste, a state need not and cannot limit the amount of waste received
by the facilities within its borders, nor may the importing state commit that
disposal capacity to the other states in its regional agreement. The Eleventh
Circuit impliedly agreed that, even though the importing state must allocate ca-
pacity to the exporting state in order for the exporting state to meet its capacity
a consequence, it can no longer adequately insure the safety and protection of its citizens
from these hazards;
(11) While the use of landfills for the disposal of hazardous wastes is presently an
approved method of hazard[ous] waste management, the federal and state governments are
implementing phased bans on land disposal and CERCLA describes the landfilling of
wastes as the least desirable regulatory technology;
(12) The State of Alabama has a genuine and significant interest in protecting its citi-
zens and its environment from the unencumbered influx of hazardous waste generated in
states which do not responsibly provide for the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazard-
ous wastes within their own borders or which refuse to enter into an interstate or regional
agreement to share the responsibilities of safe and effective hazardous waste management
as required by CERCLA, as amended;
(13) The State of Alabama is compelled by the actions of other states which refuse to
responsibly provide for hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal within their bor-
ders or fail to cooperate in an interstate or regional plan for hazardous waste management,
to enact legislation establishing a comprehensive waste management program in compli-
ance with CERCLA, and which safeguards against the irresponsibility of other states
which do not have adequate hazardous waste management programs by prohibiting the
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste in Alabama which are generated in a
state which does not allow hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities within that state
or which has not entered into an interstate or regional agreement to assure availability of
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities.
(14) The imposition of the requirements contained in this legislation will encourage
the development of new waste disposal facilities in other states in accord with the inten-
tions of Congress in enacting Section 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9), and will have the beneficial
effect of reducing, in an orderly manner, the nation's dependency on landfilling as a meth-
odology for disposing of hazardous wastes.
ALABAMA ACT No. 89-788 (1989).
128. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 720.
129. Id. "[A]labama may satisfy its capacity assurance requirements by any combination of
three measures: (1) creating new disposal capacity within the state, (2) entering into interstate or
regional agreements allowing Alabama to use capacity located in other states, and (3) contracting
with private waste management facilities." Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. See Brief of Appellants at 4-10, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
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assurance requirement,1 32 the importing state neither needs nor deserves to have
any control over the disposal capacity within its borders. Acceptance of this
argument reduces the SARA capacity assurance requirements to little more than
congressional babble. Under this theory, an importing state need only "prom-
ise" to provide disposal capacity to an exporting state, but may do nothing to
ensure that the disposal capacity will be available once the out-of-state hazard-
ous waste trucks arrive at the dumping ground door.
For Alabama to participate in and comply with SARA capacity assurance
requirements, it must allocate to other states a portion of its hazardous waste
disposal capacity; in return that state must allocate to Alabama part of the haz-
ardous waste disposal capacity. Only then will the states be assured that they
can dispose of all their domestically produced hazardous waste. A state statute
that seeks to allow a state to comply with the express wishes of Congress serves a
legitimate local purpose and satisfies the first prong of the "strict scrutiny" test.
In addition to allowing the state to comply with SARA, Alabama offers a
second compelling state interest for the Holley Bill-protection of the health
and safety of its citizens and the state's environment. Courts will always look
behind the stated justification for legislation and make determinations regarding
a law's true purpose based on its effect. 133 However, the Supreme Court has
voiced a deferential standard when reviewing state laws aimed at protecting the
health and safety of the state's citizens.' 34 The Supreme Court has held that
state power to regulate commerce is greatest when the state is addressing health
and safety matters: 35 "[I]f safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will
not second-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison
with related burdens on interstate commerce. Those who would challenge such
bona fide safety regulations must overcome a 'strong presumption of valid-
132. The Department of Justice concedes this much (though perhaps inadvertently) in its brief
by stating that "an exporting state must obtain an importing state's agreement that it will allocate
capacity." Id. at 8.
133. In Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Supreme Court recognized
that it is appropriate for the Court to look behind the stated justification for legislation and to deter-
mine its true purpose based on its effect. The Court said:
[To accept] that the ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health measure,
* would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action
other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance where a
state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.
Id. at 354.
In Dean Milk, the Court invalidated on commerce clause grounds a Wisconsin statute regulat-
ing the sale of milk because the statute was determined to erect an economic barrier protecting a
major local industry from out-of-state competition. Id. at 356. Wisconsin sought to justify the stat-
ute on health and safety reasons. Id. at 353-54.
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), the Supreme Court said: "[ hen considering
the purpose of a challenged statute, this Court is not bound by '[t]he name, description or characteri-
zation given it by the legislature or the courts of the State,' but will determine for itself the practical
impact of the law." Id. at 336 (quoting Lacoste v. Louisiana Dep't of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545,
550 (1924)). Hughes involved an Oklahoma law prohibiting minnows seined or procured within the
waters of Oklahoma form being sold out-of-state. The law was invalidated as an unconstitutional
restraint on interstate commerce. Id. at 325.
134. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (holding that regula-
tions enacted to promote public health and safety are granted particular deference).
135. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981).
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it."136 Added to this presumption of validity is the Court's recognition that:
Not all intentional barriers to interstate trade are protectionist, how-
ever, and the Commerce Clause "is not a guaranty of the right to im-
port into a state whatever one may please, absent a prohibition by
Congress, regardless of the effects of the importation upon the local
community." Even overt discrimination against interstate trade may
be justified where .. out-of-state goods or services are particularly
likely for some reason to threaten the health and safety of a State's
citizens or the integrity of its natural resources. 137
In making its health and safety argument, Alabama called attention to the
dramatic increase in the amount of hazardous waste shipped to the Emelle facil-
ity over the last ten years.' 38 The Emelle facility received less than 200 million
pounds of hazardous waste in 1978. By 1985 that figure had grown to 682 mil-
lion pounds, and estimates projected that figure to increase to 1.6 billion pounds
of hazardous waste by 1989.139 Moreover, Alabama argued that the presence of
trucks hauling hazardous waste across the state's highways has increased the
risk of accidents and injury.140
ChemWaste countered Alabama's contentions by arguing that out-of-state
wastes and in-state wastes present identical health and safety concerns and that
any attempt to justify the Holley Bill on health and safety grounds must there-
fore fail.14 1 This argument is drawn from the reasoning in City of Philadelphia,
in which the Supreme Court refused to recognize any distinctions between the
harms caused by domestic and foreign waste after it is placed in a landfill site. 142
There can be no disagreement about the serious threat hazardous waste
poses to both humans and the environment.' 43 As defined by Congress, 144 haz-
ardous waste is a product that may "cause[] or significantly contribute to an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious or irreversible, or incapacitating
reversible, illness."' 4 5 Alabama's concerns over the dangers associated with
hazardous waste transportation are well grounded,146 and the potential for mass
disaster is ever present. Even though hazardous waste disposal facilities are gen-
136. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
137. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n.19 (1986) (citation omitted).
138. Brief of Appellees at 16-17, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 29.
141. Brief of Appellants at 10-12, Chem Waste (No.90-7047).
142. 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
143. The July 14, 1989, issue of the Environmental Law Reporter contained the results of a
survey of U.S. and Canadian actuaries (who make economic, social, and statistical evaluations for
the insurance industry of financial implications of future events). That survey revealed that actuaries
believe chemical wastes will pose the greatest threat to public health and generate the greatest envi-
ronmental cost to society by the turn of the century. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 539-40 (July 14, 1989).
144. See supra note 3.
145. 42 U.S.C § 6903(5)(a), (b) (1988).
146. From 1980 to 1988 (including only preliminary figures for 1988) there were 106,859 acci-
dents involving hazardous waste transportation. Those accidents (which include combined figures
for all types of transport) accounted for 121 deaths and 2907 injuries. STATiSTICAL ABsRAcT OF
THE UNITED STATES 598 (110th ed. 1990).
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erally located in rural areas, 147 the dangers associated with transportation are
related to the number of miles hazardous waste haulers must travel and the
volume of waste being shipped into any one state.1 48
The Eleventh Circuit in ChemWaste ignored the deferential standard ac-
corded state health and safety regulations and found the Holley Bill to be noth-
ing more than a protectionist wolf wrapped in the sheep's clothing of
environmental protection. The court of appeals found that the Holley Bill could
not be justified on health and safety grounds because "Alabama did not ban the
shipment of all hazardous wastes into the state, but only shipments from certain
states."
149
The Chem Waste court suggested that the state law in question is unconsti-
tutional because, when passing the law, Alabama failed to draft the legislation in
a clearly unconstitutional fashion. In other words, the Chem Waste court implied
that the Alabama law cannot be aimed at legitimate health and safety reasons
because the law does not prevent all hazardous waste from coming into Ala-
bama. However, such a complete ban clearly would be unconstitutional under
City of Philadelphia and under the Supreme Court's previous decisions in vari-
ous transportation cases.150 Considering that the ChemWaste court found the
147. Emelle exemplifies this phenomenon. Location of such facilities in rural sites is seemingly a
function of the lack of political clout residents in small communities possess and the obvious health
and safety fears of transporting hazardous waste in more populous areas.
It has also been noted that hazardous waste sites in poor, rural counties are entering the
Superfund program at only one half the rate of sites in counties nationwide. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1961 (April 13, 1990). However, once a rural site is placed on the National Priorities List, cleanup
work proceeds at about the same pace as cleanup at other sites. Id.
148. The great irony in defending the health and safety aspects of the Alabama law is that if each
state would comply with the expressed wishes of Congress and site disposal facilities within its bor-
ders and/or enter into regional or interstate agreements to manage the disposal of hazardous waste,
there would be no need for states (other than those in a compact agreement with Alabama) to ship
waste to Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit noted that prior to release of the list of states the Holley
Bill prohibited from exporting hazardous waste to Alabama, forty-eight states were shipping waste
to the Emelle facility. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 715. Such irresponsibility creates a hazard not only
for Alabama, but for every state that the hazardous waste must traverse before reaching Alabama.
Compliance with CERCLA would make it unlikely that a state would have to go outside its region
to dispose of hazardous waste, and, accordingly, no state would be exposed to any more risk than is
absolutely necessary for safe disposal of these caustic byproducts.
149. Id. Though not cited by the court, this holding seems based largely on the reasoning of-
fered by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982), cert
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). In General Electric, the Seventh Circuit held an Illinois statute banning
importation of all spent nuclear fuel to be violative of the commerce clause. Id. at 214. Writing for
the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner found the Illinois transportation safety argument "unconvincing
because it allows intrastate shipments, and even interstate shipments so long as they are not for the
purpose of storage in Illinois." Id.
In its brief, ChemWaste sought to emphasize the reasoning of the General Electric decision by
noting that not only does Alabama permit intrastate and interstate shipments of hazardous waste,
but Alabama, unlike Illinois, will also accept waste from all states not prohibited by the Holley Bill
from shipping waste to Alabama. This argument neither proves nor adds anything to ChemWaste's
contention. Whether hazardous waste is crossing Alabama to get to the Emelle facility or crossing
Alabama to get to Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, etc., it is still crossing Alabama.
Alabama's willingness to accept waste from certain states does not prove that the Holley Bill was not
promulgated partially for health and safety reasons.
150. See, e.g., Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 677-79 (1981) (invali-
dating on commerce clause grounds an Iowa law prohibiting trucks of a certain length from entering
the state).
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Holley Bill (with its partial ban on importation based on lack of compliance with
SARA) unconstitutional, it is unlikely that same court would have upheld a
state law that not only prohibited all other states from disposing of their hazard-
ous waste in Alabama, but also prohibited all hazardous waste from even enter-
ing Alabama. To say that the Holley Bill is unconstitutional because it does not
take a form that would be clearly unconstitutional, or does not have companion
legislation that is clearly unconstitutional, leaves Alabama with no acceptable
means for addressing its health and safety concerns. The court seems to be man-
dating that Alabama either attempt to pass a clearly unconstitutional law, or
pass no law at all. Such a "Hobson's choice" would leave Alabama with no
viable legislative alternative through which to protect Alabama citizens.
The court of appeals' reasoning is equally troubling because it fails to recog-
nize Alabama's need to comply with SARA. The Chem Waste court realized
that for states to comply with SARA, they must enter interstate agreements with
other states; it is neither financially feasible nor necessary for every state to pro-
vide facilities for disposal of every type of hazardous waste.151 Despite this rec-
ognition, the court implied that the only law that could be justified by health and
safety reasons would be one that bans importation of all out-of-state waste.
Thus, if Alabama hopes to offer health and safety protections to its citizens, the
state either must build disposal facilities to accommodate all its domestically
produced hazardous waste or simply choose not to comply with SARA. This
court-forced option blatantly contradicts Congress's desire that a state be able to
meet its capacity assurance requirement by joining interstate or regional
agreements.
The Eleventh Circuit found it untenable that Alabama could offer health
and safety justifications for the Holley Bill yet still allow interstate and intrastate
shipments of hazardous waste. Indeed, were there no other considerations in-
volved, it is unlikely that Alabama could refute this argument successfully. Ala-
bama's position, however, is sound given the other constitutional and
unavoidable constraints faced by the state legislature.
First, Alabama could not ban all intrastate movement of hazardous waste.
Unless every hazardous waste producer in Alabama has on-site disposal facili-
ties, there is no solution but to allow those producers to transport their waste to
a licensed disposal facility. A state must be permitted to accommodate disposal
of all domestically produced hazardous waste; such disposal necessarily involves
intrastate shipments of the hazardous material.
Second, in order to comply with the capacity assurance mandates of SARA,
Alabama must be allowed to enter regional compacts with other states for the
disposal of hazardous waste-and such compacts, by their nature, involve a mu-
tual agreement to accommodate waste. A ban on all out-of-state waste would
automatically remove Alabama from SARA compliance. For a court to require
a state to fail to comply with the mandates of federal law would allow that court
151. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 717.
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to substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress. The Eleventh Circuit
cannot expect Alabama to ignore its obligation to comply with SARA.
Finally, the argument that continuing to allow interstate shipments of haz-
ardous waste to cross Alabama to disposal facilities in other states negates the
health and safety features of the Holley Bill may look appealing on its face, but,
in reality, the argument has little relevance. It is true that Emelle was accepting
waste from forty-eight states before passage of the Holley Bill, 152 but most of the
waste shipped to Emelle came from a very few states.153 To ban importation of
waste from states not in compliance with SARA or not in a compact with Ala-
bama means that the waste from those states is unlikely to enter or pass through
Alabama. As with any region of the country, the waste most likely to traverse
Alabama on its way to another state's disposal facility is waste produced by
other states in that region. Those states, if the Holley Bill is allowed to stand,
are soon likely to enter a waste disposal compact with Alabama. Hazardous
waste from Philadelphia is unlikely to be transported through Alabama on its
way to New Jersey, and Alabama is unlikely to find waste haulers from Arizona
cruising down the interstate highway on their way to California. By encourag-
ing other states to enter interstate hazardous waste disposal agreements, the
Holley Bill would have a direct and positive impact on the amount of waste that
both enters Alabama and crosses Alabama headed to other disposal destinations.
In sum, Alabama, through the Holley Bill, attempted to do everything con-
stitutionally permissible to protect the health and safety of its citizens while still
meeting the SARA capacity assurance requirements set by Congress. Addition-
ally, by accepting hazardous waste from other states in its compact, Alabama
sought to protect the health and safety of its citizens by providing -the state with
access to disposal facilities that handle the types of hazardous waste that Ala-
bama is presently unable to accommodate internally. The desire to comply with
SARA and the health and safety factors accompanying hazardous waste dispo-
sal are sufficiently legitimate local purposes. The Holley Bill therefore satisfies
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test under the dormant commerce clause.
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test examines whether a state law
provides the least discriminatory method for effectuating its legitimate local con-
cerns. 154 The analysis of the compelling state interest behind the law already
has made it clear that the Holley Bill satisfies this second prong.
The second tier of strict scrutiny analysis does not require that the legisla-
tion be nondiscriminatory; it requires only that the state enact legislation that is
the least discriminatory means available for achieving the local-purpose ends.
The only way Alabama could comply with SARA while still protecting its citi-
zens from the dangers associated with being a hazardous waste dumping ground
was to close its borders to those states that are content to export their problems
elsewhere while ignoring their responsibility under CERCLA. It would be im-
possible, impractical, and unconstitutional for Alabama to close its borders to all
152. Id. at 715.
153. See infra note 157.
154. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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hazardous waste.1 55 Conversely, it would be impossible for Alabama both to
comply with SARA and to protect the health and safety of its citizens without
closing its borders to at least some waste. The Holley Bill represents a compro-
mise that serves local, state, and national interests regarding hazardous waste
management. It protects the health and safety of its citizens by rejecting only
those states that choose to be rejected by their failure to comply with federal
law.
Nothing illustrates the least-discriminatory nature of the Holley Bill more
effectively than the district court's factual determination that the Holley Bill
would affect only three-tenths of one percent of America's toxic waste.1 56 Since
some of that hazardous waste comes from states that have either complied with
SARA or have entered a compact with Alabama, the total amount of waste
impacted by the Holley Bill is less than three-tenths of one percent of all hazard-
ous waste produced annually.15 7 A law that ensures a state's ability to comply
with federal legislation and allows that state to offer additional health and safety
protections to its citizens while impacting such a small amount of the nation's
total annual hazardous waste output fits well within the "least discriminatory
means" test under strict scrutiny analysis.1 53
Even if one were to concede, given the confused nature of commerce clause
jurisprudence, 159 that the Holley Bill is protectionist or discriminatory, and
therefore fails strict scrutiny analysis, Alabama still has one final "string to [its]
bow"16°-implied Congressional authorization. It is a well-accepted commerce
clause principle that Congress can authorize a state to take regulatory measures
that otherwise would be unconstitutional.1 61 If Alabama passed the Holley Bill
pursuant to such implied congressional authorization, then the bill is valid de-
spite any impact it may have on interstate commerce.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
156. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F.
Supp. 792, 797 (N.D. Ala.), vacated, ChemWaste, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh
Circuit did not refute this lower court finding.
157. After passage of the Holley Bill, the impact of the legislation was downplayed by a
ChemWaste spokesperson when he said:
I don't think in the long run that [the Holley Bill] will affect volumes at Emelle all that
much, although that's very difficult to say with precision.... We're a very big operation.
As a practical matter, only four states (of the 22 banned) will be affected. And the total
(from all 22 states and the District of Columbia) is less than 100,000 tons a year, with the
overwhelming amount coming from Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina and Virginia.
Brief of Appellees at 34, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047). North Carolina subsequently entered the com-
pact. See infra note 167. The amount coming from Mississippi was only two percent of that state's
annual total. Brief of Appellees at 34 n.12, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
158. That such a small amount of the nation's hazardous waste is affected by the Holley Bill does
not lessen Alabama's justification of the bill on health and safety grounds. For purposes of the strict
scrutiny test under the commerce clause, the impact of the bill on interstate commerce can be mea-
sured only by looking at its overall national impact. However, the ability of the legislation to im-
prove health and safety conditions for Alabama residents can be determined only by looking at the
amount of waste actually entering Alabama.
159. See supra note 58.
160. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,44 (1980); see supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
161. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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In Chem Waste the Eleventh Circuit recognized that "'[w]here state or lo-
cal government action is specifically authorized by Congress, it is not subject to
the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with interstate commerce,' "162 but
the court found no such congressional authorization for the Holley Bill. Look-
ing for an "'expressly stated' and 'unmistakably clear' "163 authorization by
Congress, the court concluded that "[i]f Congress intended to allow the states to
restrict the interstate movement of hazardous wastes as Alabama has tried to do,
Congress could (and still can) plainly say so. '164
The primary purpose behind section 104(c)(9) of SARA is to encourage
states to site new hazardous waste disposal facilities.1 65 Prior to the passage of
SARA, the states, despite producing ever increasing amounts of hazardous
waste, were not siting new hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities.
The public pressure brought to bear by the "not-in-my-backyard" syndrome 16 6
makes it politically unwise for states to proceed with plans for accommodating
domestically produced waste, particularly when those states can ship their haz-
ardous waste to their more responsible neighbors.' 67 Congress recognized that
162. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d at 721 (quoting White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ-
ers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983)). The court further acknowledged that" 'Congress may redefine
the distribution of power over interstate commerce by permitting the states to regulate the commerce
in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible."' Id. (quoting South-Central Timber Dev.
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984)).
163. Id. (quoting Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 91).
164. Id. at 721-22.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); infra text accompanying notes 174-79.
166. See supra note 6.
167. North Carolina is an excellent case in point. A large producer of hazardous waste, North
Carolina chose for years to ship most of its waste to disposal facilities in Alabama and South Caro-
lina. It was only when those states threatened to close their borders to North Carolina waste that
the state began to move toward siting its own hazardous waste disposal facility.
On October 17, 1989, the Governors of Alabama, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky
entered into an interstate agreement entitled "SARA Capacity Assurance Agreement." Brief of
Appellees at 4, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047). North Carolina entered the agreement on November 8,
1989. Mississippi, North Carolina, Florida, and Georgia were not initial signatories to the agree-
ment, but were eligible to become members. Id.
Entering the interstate compact failed to solve North Carolina's problems. North Carolina
agreed to build a hazardous waste incinerator as part of an interstate agreement with Alabama,
Kentucky, South Carolina, and Tennessee. However, the state faced tremendous public opposition
to the proposed locations for the hazardous waste incinerator. The opposition was so intense and
protracted (the North Carolina legislature first created a panel charged with locating and building a
hazardous waste disposal facility in the state in 1984), that the state's Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Commission finally proposed in December 1990 Oust prior to the December 31, 1990 deadline
the state faced for applying for a permit to build the facility pursuant to the multi-state agreement)
to locate the incinerator on state-owned farmland in eastern North Carolina. Id., Dec. 17, 1990, at
8A, col. 1. However, that proposal was rejected by North Carolina's Council of State, which must
approve of the disposition of state property. Id., Dec. 14, 1990, at IA, col. 1. The North Carolina
Council of State consists of the state's Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary
of State, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, State Auditor, State Superintendent
of Public Instruction, State Treasurer, and the Commissioner of Insurance. The vote regarding
siting the facility on state property was seven to two against, with only the state's Governor and
Lieutenant Governor (the only two Republicans on the Council) voting in favor (the Commissioner
of Insurance was absent from the vote). Id. at 17A, col 1. The state legislature could override this
vote, but was not scheduled to convene until after the December 31, 1990 deadline had passed.
In response to this result, North Carolina Governor James G. Martin remarked:
Who's going to have the standing to sit down with those four neighboring governors and
persuade them that, even though we've never done anything responsible for our own waste
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the Superfund program would not succeed unless states took steps to ensure
adequate facilities for proper disposal of their hazardous waste and thereby
avoid creating new sites in need of Superfund cleanup. Congress sought to effec-
tuate creation of such disposal facilities through SARA.
The language of the SARA siting amendment expressly places upon every
state the responsibility for assuring that it can safely dispose of all hazardous
waste produced within its borders during the next two decades. 168 As noted, a
state may accomplish this either by providing adequate disposal capacity inde-
pendently, or by entering an interstate or regional agreement for disposal.169
Additionally, the legislative history accompanying SARA leaves no ques-
tions about the intended purpose of the siting amendment.' 70 In March 1985, a
in 10 years, that somehow if you'll just give us one more chance, we'll come up with the
courage and the fortitude and the ability to meet that responsibility?
Id. at IA, col. 4. In explaining their vote against siting the incinerator on state property, several
Council members stated that the process used by the state's Hazardous Waste Management Com-
mission to select the site was flawed, and that the proposed site had several existing problems. Id. at
17A, col. I.
In response to this result, South Carolina Governor Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. announced that
his state would bar the shipment of hazardous wastes from North Carolina into South Carolina if
North Carolina failed to meet the December 31 deadline for siting a facility. Id. South Carolina
notified North Carolina on December 17, 1990, that the ban would begin on January 1, 1991. Id.,
Dec. 18, 1990, at IA, col. 5.
On December 21, 1990, U.S. District Court Judge Matthew Perry issued a 10-day temporary
restraining order barring South Carolina from closing its borders to North Carolina's hazardous
waste. The temporary restraining order was sought by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council and
ThermalKEM, Inc. (owners of a hazardous waste disposal facility in Rock Hill, South Carolina). In
issuing the order Judge Perry expressed concern that South Carolina's actions would violate the
commerce clause. The Charlotte Observer, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1B, col. 5.
On December 31, 1990, Judge Perry extended the temporary restraining order an additional 10
days, keeping South Carolina hazardous waste disposal facilities open to North Carolina waste at
least through January 10, 1991. The News and Observer (Raleigh), Jan. 3, 1991, at 3B, col. 3. South
Carolina remains determined to block waste from North Carolina. As a spokesperson for South
Carolina Governor Campbell said, "The lawyers are huddling. The fight is on." Id. at 3B, col. 4.
On December 17, 1990, Alabama notified North Carolina that the state would be barred from
shipping hazardous waste to the Emelle facility beginning January 1, 1991. Id., Dec. 17, 1990, at
IA, col. 1. Alabama based its authority to ban waste from North Carolina on the Holley Bill and
Alabama's continuing challenge to the Chem Waste decision. As of January 3, 1991, Alabama had
taken no steps to implement its threatened ban of North Carolina waste that was to begin on January
1, 1991. Id., Jan. 3, 1991, at 3B, col. 3.
In response to these threats, North Carolina Attorney General Lacy Thornburg said that the
state would consider legal action to challenge such bans. Id. at IA, col. 2.
Of all the hazardous waste North Carolina industries shipped out of state in 1988, 51% went to
South Carolina, 13% went to Alabama, and the remaining 36% went to 25 other states. Id., Dec.
18, 1990, at IA, col. 5.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(A) (1988).
169. Id. § 9604(c)(9)(B).
170. For recent examples of scholarly works addressing the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation, see Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423
(1988); Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Intentionalist
Approach, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1988); Tribe, Judicial Interpretation of Statutes: Three Axioms, I 1
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 51 (1988); Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277
(1990).
Judge Wald notes that the "basically sensible approach" employed by the courts when using
legislative history is now "under heavy attack from the Supreme Court." Wald, supra, at 279. One
of the sharpest critics of the current method of employing legislative history is Justice Scalia, who
seems to support a "textualist" view for statutory interpretation. See id. at 281-82.
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Senate committee noted the need for the "creation of new [hazardous waste
treatment] facilities employing the most advanced waste management technolo-
gies,"171 and further stated the obvious requirement that "sites on which these
facilities can operate must be found and made available." 172 While other con-
gressional reports offer the same rationale for the amendment, 173 the most tell-
ing statements come from the sponsor of the siting amendment, Senator Chaffee
of Rhode Island. In September 1985 Senator Chaffee echoed the need for addi-
tional safe disposal facilities by commenting that "[tihe broad social need for
safe hazardous waste management facilities often has not been strongly repre-
sented in the siting process.... [I]f the RCRA and Superfund Programs are to
work-if public health and the environment are to be protected-the necessary
sites must be available." 174 On the day the SARA amendments passed the Sen-
ate, Senator Chaffee unequivocally stated that "[t]he objective of the siting
amendment is to force states to provide safe and adequate facilities for toxic and
hazardous waste." 175
Once the congressional purpose behind SARA is established, it is incum-
bent upon Alabama to show that the Holley Bill serves to implement that pur-
pose. The Holley Bill, by prohibiting importation of hazardous waste from
states that do not meet SARA capacity assurance requirements or have adequate
domestic disposal facilities, would force those states to take steps to site hazard-
ous waste disposal facilities in order to participate in interstate or regional dispo-
sal agreements. 176 Siting such disposal facilities would serve to implement
directly the legislative purpose behind SARA.
North Carolina is an excellent example of a state that began in earnest the
process of siting a hazardous waste disposal facility because of the potential im-
pact of the Holley Bill. North Carolina was on the original list of states banned
by the Holley Bill from exporting waste to Alabama. 177 For years North Caro-
lina, one of the larger hazardous waste producers in the nation, 178 had chosen to
ship its waste elsewhere rather than fight the political battle of siting a facil-
171. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985).
172. Id.
173. See H. REP. No. 253(), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2835. Issued by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, the report
addresses the need for the legislation by stating: "The current reauthorization [of CERCLA], com-
ing when it does, forces Congress to face a very fundamental policy question: how to ensure in the
future that there are adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly repudiated, mismanage-
ment problems are behind us." Id. at 55.
See also JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 194 reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
3276, 3287 (urging the importance of assuring the availability of hazardous waste treatment or dis-
posal facilities with adequate capacity to accommodate the wastes expected to be generated within
the state).
174. 131 CONG. REc. S11568 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1985) (comments of Senator Chaffee).
175. 132 CONG. REc. S14924 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (comments of Senator Chaffee).
176. Brief of Appellees at 15-16, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
177. See supra note 29.
178. In 1987 North Carolina generated 2.8 billion pounds of hazardous waste. Price, Toxic
Waste Is Big Business and Big Headaches in Mecklenburg County, Bus. J. (CHARLOTTE), December
19, 1988, at 17.
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ity.179 The lack of a disposal facility had prevented North Carolina from being
able to enter the original southeastern regional hazardous waste disposal agree-
ment.1 80 Passage of the Holley Bill spurred North Carolina to agree to site a
disposal facility, 181 and, based solely on this promise to provide a facility, North
Carolina became a signatory to the regional hazardous waste disposal
agreement. 18 2
It has been argued that, rather than having a positive impact on the siting
of hazardous waste disposal facilities, state legislation like the Holley Bill will
lead to a "civil war" among the states over hazardous waste disposal.183 How-
ever, such results have failed to materialize.1 84 In an amicus brief presented by
the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council (HWTC) on behalf of ChemWaste, the
HWTC cites an Executive Order issued by the Governor of South Carolina ban-
ning the importation of hazardous waste from North Carolina and certain other
states185 as the first shot in this impending "civil war." 18 6  Actions such as
179. See supra note 167.
180. The original signatories to the agreement were Alabama, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Kentucky.
18 1. North Carolina has faced stiff opposition to the siting of a disposal facility. See supra note
167.
182. Brief of Appellees at 22, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
183. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Hazardous Waste Treatment Council at 9, Chem Waste (No. 90-
7047).
184. The current conflict between North Carolina and South Carolina and Alabama had its
genesis in North Carolina's inability to site a hazardous waste disposal facility as North Carolina
had promised to do when it entered the multi-state compact. The conflict is not based on anything
even closely resembling a "civil war." Indeed, South Carolina and Alabama openly welcomed North
Carolina into their regional hazardous waste disposal compact. See infra text accompanying note
190.
185. The Executive Order issued by Governor Carroll Campbell on July 6, 1989,
Bars any one state from sending more than 10,000 tons of waste per quarter, or 35,000
tons a year, to South Carolina... [s]tipulates that 20 percent of the 135,000 tons must be
pretreated to reduce its volume and toxicity, increasing to 25 percent in 1990 and 30 per-
cent in 1991; and... [florces GSX officials [a specific disposal facility located in Pinewood,
S.C.] to reserve room every year for 54,000 tons of hazardous waste from South Carolina-
or 40 percent of the waste that can be buried there annually. If, however, officials from the
Department of Health and Environmental Control calculate during the last three months
of any year that the state's industries will not need that much space, [the facility] can allow
other states to use the capacity.
20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 542 (July 14, 1989).
This order followed a January order by Governor Campbell that closed the GSX landfill to
hazardous waste from states such as North Carolina and Florida-states South Carolina felt had
refused to bury the same kinds of hazardous waste within their borders. Id.
At the same time that the July 6 order was signed, South Carolina removed North Carolina and
Florida from its list of states banned from shipping waste to South Carolina. A spokesman for
Governor Campbell said that the decision to allow North Carolina to again ship waste to South
Carolina was a result of North Carolina's decision to move forward with the process of opening a
hazardous waste treatment facility of it own. The North Carolina legislature had passed a law in
May 1989 that gave the state's Hazardous Waste Treatment Commission the power to site a hazard-
ous waste disposal facility, and also gave the Governor the power to negotiate agreements with
neighboring states to share the management of hazardous waste. Id. at 543.
In addition to the Executive Orders signed by South Carolina's Governor, the South Carolina
legislature amended state law to provide for limits much like those imposed by the Holley Bill. The
South Carolina legislature amended § 44-56-130 of the 1976 code by adding:
(4) It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a waste treatment facility
within this State to accept any hazardous waste generated in any jurisdiction which prohib-
its by law the treatment of that hazardous waste within that jurisdiction or which has not
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those taken by the Governor of South Carolina will not serve to undermine
CERCLA's goal of creating a national hazardous waste policy. Granted, legisla-
tion like the Holley Bill may inspire other "dumping ground" states to pass
similar legislation, but such legislation serves to strengthen the congressional
objective of seeing more hazardous waste disposal facilities sited. Again, North
Carolina is by far the best example of a state that, because it could no longer ship
its waste to a neighboring state, finally took long-delayed action toward accom-
modating its domestically produced hazardous waste.18 7 Although North Caro-
lina has encountered significant obstacles in getting a hazardous waste disposal
facility sited,188 those problems have all been internal and unrelated to any ac-
tion taken by either Alabama or South Carolina. 189 In fact, North Carolina
Governor James G. Martin stated that while the other southeastern states were
establishing tough conditions to ensure that North Carolina would do its part in
a regional disposal compact, they had "also demonstrated a true spirit of cooper-
ation in working to include North Carolina rather than keep us out." 190
The lack of a current "civil war" is further demonstrated by the fact that
three of the ten states joining Ohio in an amicus brief presented on behalf of
Alabama in Chem Waste were on the original Holley Bill "blacklist" issued by
Alabama.19 1 There simply is no evidence presented to support the contention
that limited bans on importation of hazardous waste endanger the SARA
entered into an interstate or regional agreement for the safe treatment of hazardous waste
pursuant to the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act. Written documentation demonstrating compliance with this item must be sub-
mitted to the department before the transportation of any hazardous waste into the State
for treatment.
(5) It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a waste storage facility within
this State to accept any hazardous waste generated in any jurisdiction which prohibits by
law the storage of that hazardous waste within that jurisdiction or which has not entered
into an interstate or regional agreement for the safe storage of hazardous waste pursuant to
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.
Written documentation demonstrating compliance with this item must be submitted to the
department before the transportation of any hazardous waste into the State for storage.
(6) It is unlawful for any person who owns or operates a waste disposal facility within
this State to accept any hazardous waste generated in any jurisdiction which prohibits by
law the disposal of that hazardous waste within that jurisdiction or which has not entered
into an interstate or regional agreement for the safe disposal of hazardous waste pursuant
to the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.
Written documentation demonstrating compliance with this item must be submitted to the
department before the transportation of any hazardous waste into the State for disposal.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (amended by 1989 S.C. ACTS 196 § 9).
186. Brief of Amicus Curiae Hazardous Waste Treatment Council at 9, Chem Waste (No.90-
7047).
187. North Carolina officials readily admit that legislation banning export of North Carolina
hazardous waste to Alabama and South Carolina was the turning point in North Carolina's decision
to site its own facility. See Brief of Appellees at 22-23, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. See id.
190. Brief of Appellees at 23, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047).
191. Ten states joined Ohio in submitting an amicus in support of Alabama. Joining Ohio were
Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, and Utah. See Brief of Amicus Curiae and Motion for Leave to Participate in Oral Argument
Submitted By the State of Ohio, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047). Of these, Arizona, New Mexico, and
North Carolina were on the original Alabama "blacklist." See supra note 29.
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goals. 192
The Chem Waste court erred in finding that the SARA siting amendments
do not impliedly authorize the Holley Bill. The court looked no further once it
failed to find "expressly stated" and "unmistakably clear" congressional authori-
zation. By terminating its analysis so quickly, the court failed to give proper
consideration to the overall objective of and policy implications behind SARA.
The Chem Waste court was correct when it called for congressional authori-
zation for state legislation to be "unmistakably clear," and, indeed, the Supreme
Court has been slow to find congressional authorization for state regulatory ac-
tivity that impacts interstate commerce. However, under the circumstances, the
Chem Waste court applied that "expressly stated" and "unmistakably clear"
standard too rigidly in determining whether SARA impliedly authorizes the
Holley Bill. The Supreme Court has explained that "[tihere is no talismanic
significance to the phrase 'expressly stated.' "193 The Court has determined
that the requirement embodied by the "expressly stated" standard is that "con-
gressional intent must be unmistakably clear." 194 In Chem Waste the Eleventh
Circuit took a firm but flexible standard for determining the existence of con-
gressional authorization and applied it rigidly, thereby frustrating the federal
policy interests advanced by the Holley Bill.
The Supreme Court has said that the "unmistakably clear" standard may
be met through implied congressional authorization. In South-Central Timber
Development v. Wunnicke, the Court stated: "'express authorization is not al-
ways necessary. There will be instances ... where federal policy is so clearly
delineated that a state may enact a parallel policy without explicit congressional
approval, even if the purpose and effect of the state law is to favor local
interests.' "195
A year before South-Central, the Supreme Court had acknowledged its ac-
ceptance of implied congressional approval in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Construction Employers, Inc. 196 In White the Court applied a market partici-
192. The ChemWaste court, in a footnote, dismissed Alabama's use of North Carolina as an
example of the positive effect of the Holley Bill. The court stated that "we reject defendants' argu-
ment that this activity legitimates Alabama's attempts to enforce the federal capacity assurance re-
quirements set out in section 109(c)." ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721 n.10.
193. South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984). In South-Central Timber,
the Supreme Court invalidated an Alaska law requiring that all trees cut from state lands be partially
processed in Alaska prior to export. Id. at 92-93. Alaska argued that a federal law requiring the
equivalent treatment for all trees cut off federal lands had impliedly authorized a similar state action.
Id. at 89.
194. Id. at 91. The full text of the Court's defining statement in South-Central reads:
There is no talismanic significance to the phrase "expressly stated," however; it merely
states one way of meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed from
the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably
clear. The requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state leg-
islation is mandated by the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Id. at 91-92.
195. Id. at 88 (quoting lower court opinion, South Central Timber Dev. v. Le Resche, 693 F.2d
890, 893 (9th Cir. 1982)).
196. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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pant analysis' 97 to an executive order issued by the Mayor of Boston requiring
all construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds or by funds
197. Through the market participant theory the Supreme Court has upheld state regulatory ac-
tion that might otherwise have been invalid under the dormant commerce clause. The market par-
ticipant theory comes into play when a state favors local or in-state interest in choosing its trading
partners.
The Supreme Court first embraced the market participant theory in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976). In Hughes, the Court upheld a Maryland program in which the state,
to encourage the recycling of abandoned cars, provided subsidies to in-state and out-of-state scrap
processors for each Maryland-titled hulk destroyed. The state had imposed stricter requirements on
out-of-state scrap processors than on in-state processors. See id. at 800-01. The Court found that
the State of Maryland "has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions
under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their price." Id. at
806. "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over otijers." Id. at 810.
The market participant theory was again applied by the Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980). Reeves involved an attempt by South Dakota to limit in times of shortage sales from a
state-owned cement plant solely to South Dakotans. Id. at 432-33. The Court upheld the selective
selling by South Dakota, noting the "'long recognized right'" of private traders to choose their own
trading partners. Id. at 438-39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
The Court also noted the "foresight, risk, and industry" of the state in undertaking such an enter-
prise. Id. at 446.
The Court again applied the market participant theory in White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
In two more recent decisions the Supreme Court has declined to apply the market participant
exception to state regulation. In South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), the
Court struck down an Alaska state statute that required buyers of state-owned timber to have the
timber processed in Alaska prior to shipment outside the state. In New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 272 (1988), the Court invalidated an Ohio statute designed to encourage the production
and use of gasohol by providing a tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold against the fuel tax
otherwise payable on gasoline and gasohol sales. Ohio refused the tax credit to producers in any
state that did not afford a reciprocal tax credit to Ohio producers. Id. The Court held that taxing
activity "cannot plausibly be analogized to the activity of a private purchaser." Id. at 278.
For an in-depth look at the market participant theory, see Coenen, Untangling the Market-
Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989).
The most salient aspect of the market participant theory in terms of the issue addressed by this
Note is that the theory has been applied by some lower courts to allow states and local government
entities essentially to bypass the Supreme Court's holding in City of Philadelphia. The City of Phila-
delphia opinion seemed to leave open this possibility through footnote six of that opinion, which
stated that the Court chose not to "express [its] opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent with
the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources; or New Jersey's
power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses." City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 n.6 (1978) (citations omitted).
Four recent decisions illustrate the application of the market participant theory to state at-
tempts to limit waste disposal at state-owned facilities, In Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp.
1204 (D.R.I. 1987), the district court attempted to answer the "question left unanswered in City of
Philadelphia." Id. at 1208. Drawing on earlier Supreme Court decisions holding that "a State or
local government is not subject to the restrictions of the Commerce Clause when it acts as a 'market
participant' as opposed to a 'market regulator,'" id. at 1208 (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)), the district court allowed Rhode Island to prevent the dumping of out-
of-state waste at a state-subsidized central landfill. Id. at 1212.
The court drew a distinction between a market in landfill services and landfill sites, and distin-
guished City of Philadelphia on the grounds that the New Jersey statute would have closed that
state's markets in both waste processing (a service) and landfill sites (a natural resource) because it
applied to both public and private landfills. Id. at 1211-12. The Rhode Island statute did not "pre-
clude any party, in-state or foreign, from purchasing property upon which to construct a sanitary
landfill open to all waste regardless of origin." Id. at 1211.
In making the service/site distinction, the Lefrancois court cited the Supreme Court ruling in
Reeves. Noting that cement is "the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical
plant and human labor act on raw materials," the Reeves Court allowed South Dakota to give prefer-
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that the city had authority to administer be performed by a work force consist-
ing of at least half Boston residents, and found the order did not violate the
commerce clause. The Supreme Court agreed with Boston's argument that the
executive order was authorized by federal legislation and found the order to be
"affirmatively sanctioned" by the regulations accompanying the legislation.' 98
The Supreme Court further offered that the mayor's action "sounds a harmoni-
ous note" with the federal legislation involved. 19 9 In Chem Waste the court
erred in failing to examine the Holley Bill in light of the policies expressly and
impliedly forwarded by SARA.
By failing to look for implied congressional authorization of the Holley Bill,
the Chem Waste court also ran afoul of the Supreme Court's stated policy against
interpreting statutes in a manner that will provide unreasonable results. 20° The
Supreme Court has said that "interpretations of a statute which would produce
absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with legis-
lative purpose are available."'201 The results that flow from the Chem Waste
ence to its own citizens because the state was merely a market participant and thus fit the exception
to the commerce clause. Id. at 444-47.
Three years prior to Lefrancois, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had also attempted to an-
swer the question left unanswered in footnote six of City of Philadelphia. In County Commissioners
v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984), the Maryland court held that the county was acting as
a market participant in landfill services; therefore, the dormant commerce clause did not apply. This
allowed the county to ban disposal of waste generated outside the county. Id. at 219-20, 473 A.2d at
20-21. This court also relied heavily on the distinction between a market for disposal services and a
market for disposal sites, and (as in Lefrancois) focused on the fact that the county only closed its
landfill to outside waste, it did not close its borders to anyone wanting to build and operate a landfill.
Essentially the same question arose in Evergreen Waste Systems v. Metropolitan Service Dis-
trict 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987). The court found that a county ordinance banning disposal of
foreign-produced waste did not fit the paradigm of a per se violation of the commerce clause because
the ordinance did not block the flow of interstate commerce at the State's borders. Id. at 1484. The
court then proceeded to apply the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test to the statute to determine if it
violated the commerce clause. The court found that the statute was evenhanded, effected a legiti-
mate local public purpose, and that the burden on interstate commerce was merely incidental and
not excessive when compared with the putative local benefit. Id. at 1484-85.
A final example of this commerce clause exception appears in Shayne Bros. v. District of Co-
lumbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984). Again, the same basic question was raised, and the court
answered it by making the market participant distinction. The court was favorable to County Com-
missioners v. Stevens, finding the Maryland court's analysis apposite to the considerations before
them. Id. at 1134.
The question remains whether the market participant theory will provide an exemption to state
attempts to limit the disposal of foreign hazardous waste at state owned facilities. As noted earlier,
see supra note 89, the ability of a state to provide facilities to dispose of all types of hazardous waste
produced is unlikely. The cost of providing such physical plants is prohibitive in most cases; more
importantly, the need to do so is obviated by the ability to enter interstate hazardous waste disposal
agreements. Still, had Alabama owned the Emelle facility, the market participant theory would
seem to provide an exemption and allow Alabama to limit trade to the partners of its choice.
Another question raised by the market participant theory involves quasi-public hazardous waste
disposal facilities. For example, some states, like North Carolina, play a significant role in choosing
and approving the site for privately owned disposal facilities. To the extent that such involvement,
along with continuing regulation and oversight, makes the disposal facility quasi-public, the question
arises whether the Court would apply the market-participant exemption in such situations.
198. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 215 (1983).
199. Id. at 213.
200. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (stating that "[s]tatutes
should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible").
201. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (emphasis added).
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court's interpretation of SARA can be classified as nothing, other than absurd.
The Chem Waste court invalidated Alabama legislation that would have enabled
Alabama to comply with the express statutory wishes of Congress while at the
same time encouraging other states to provide hazardous waste disposal facili-
ties. The Chem Waste court's conclusion means that, although Congress author-
ized the states to enter interstate and regional compacts for the disposal of
hazardous waste, those agreements mean little beciuse all other states not in the
compact can still ship their waste. The responsible states that join a compact
and site disposal facilities within their borders are left with no means to stop
noncompact states from exporting hazardous waste to their disposal facilities,
and thus there is no incentive for any state to site a new or additional hazardous
waste disposal facility. The only option apparently left open by the Chem Waste
court is for a state to ban importation of all hazardous waste-an option that in
itself would seem to invite a commerce clause challenge,20 2 and would also pre-
vent that state from joining interstate disposal agreements such as those ex-
pressly authorized by Congress. 20 3 The Chem Waste decision leaves Alabama
with an all-or-nothing choice that directly contradicts both express and implied
congressional policy.
In Chem Waste the Eleventh Circuit had a duty to interpret the Alabama
statutes in a manner that is most compatible with the purposes of the federal
legislation involved. 204 That duty, combined with the general deference ac-
corded state statutes aimed at health and safety, 20 5 provided the court ample
justification to find the Holley Bill sufficiently authorized by Congress.
The Chem Waste court attempts to support the determination that there is
no implied congressional authorization for the Holley Bill through one foot-
note20 6 in which the court cites Wisconsin Department of Industty, Labor and
Human Relations v. Gould20 7 for the proposition that states may not impose
penalties on conduct already penalized under federal legislation. Gould involved
an attempt by the state of Wisconsin to bar certain repeat violators of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) from doing business with the state. The
Supreme Court overturned the Wisconsin statute, finding that the NLRA had
largely displaced state regulation of industrial relations. 20 8 The ChemWaste
court's reliance on Gould is misplaced. The Gould Court was addressing a state
attempt to regulate activity in an area in which regulatory authority had been
usurped by Congress. In contrast, the Holley Bill addresses an area of regula-
tory activity in which Congress not only expects but requires state involvement.
202. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
204. See, eg., Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (stating that
the Supreme Court's duty in interpreting statutory language is "to find that interpretation which can
most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its
scheme and with general purposes that Congress manifested" (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Lion Oil Co.,
352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
205. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
206. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721 n.10.
207. 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986).
208. Id.
1991) 1035
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
From its inception CERCLA has provided for state involvement in the hazard-
ous waste regulation process. SARA also envisions an increasing role for the
states in this area. 209 Additionally, in Gould the Supreme Court sought to avoid
conflicts between state and federal law.210 In contrast, the Holley Bill is state
legislation that parallels and seeks to coexist with federal legislation in a com-
bined effort to reach the same end.2 11
The Chem Waste court found that SARA provides the exclusive "sanction"
for states that fail to comply with SARA capacity assurance requirements, and
that Alabama cannot apply the Holley Bill as an additional "sanction" on those
states.212 The SARA sanction identified by the Chem Waste court is the EPA's
power, upon a state's failure to meet its capacity assurance requirements, to
withhold Superfund money for remedial cleanup activity within that state.213
The Eleventh Circuit deemed this an effective remedy, noting that "almost every
state [has] at least one site on [the Superfund National Priorities List]." 2 14
Whether one considers SARA to dangle a Superfund-money carrot before the
states to entice them to comply, or threatens the states with a no-Superfund-
money stick if they fail to comply, the reality of the Chem Waste court's decision
is to break the carrot/stick in half.2 15
Clearly, the Superfund program does not work as envisioned.216 The
Chem Waste court would have overstepped its authority had it found that be-
cause Congress passed a statute that provides an insufficient and ineffective sanc-
tion, the court must allow the states to provide an additional sanction. The
Chem Waste court, however, should have found that Congress, in passing an
amendment to CERCLA, did not consider withholding Superfund money for
remedial measures as the exclusive method for encouraging states to comply
with the goals of the amendments. Congress passed SARA because CERCLA
was not working properly. Considering the tremendous amount of information
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988) (allowing a state to administer its own hazardous waste
program).
210. Gould, 475 U.S. at 286.
211. The ChemWaste court noted that in the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2021b-j (1982 & Supp. V 1987), Congress specifically authorized states that enter a multi-
state disposal compact to ban importation of waste from noncompact states. Chem Waste, 910 F.2d
at 722 n.12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(e)(2), (f)(1)). Apparently the Eleventh Circuit believes this
inclusion in one federal statute and absence in another to be a case of expresslo unius est excluslo
alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). However, the irrational result that
follows such an interpretation seems to make this more a case of expressio eorum quae tacite insunt
nihil operatur (the expression or express mention of those things which are tacitly implied avails
nothing).
212. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721.
213. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The EPA's authority to withhold money applies
only to a remedial cleanups in a state. Noncomplying states remain eligible for emergency cleanup
funds. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9)(b) (1988).
214. ChemWaste, 910 F.2d at 721 n.11.
215. For the purpose of subsequent discussion this Note will use the Chem Waste court's descrip-
tion and refer to the SARA provisions regarding Superfund money as a "sanction."
216. A 1989 report issued by the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on
Superfund, Ocean, and Water Protection stated that "EPA's implementation of Superfund has, in
general, failed to meet public expectations and mandates of the law." 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 108
(May 12, 1989).
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about Superfund that is available to Congress2 17 and the congressional recogni-
tion that states were not providing needed hazardous waste disposal facilities, it
is unlikely that Congress, in trying to correct the deficiencies of CERCLA, con-
templated that states could not likewise take action to force other states to com-
ply with SARA .218
The Superfund program has experienced a number of problems. Withhold-
ing Superfund money as a sanction offered very little incentive for the states to
meet the capacity assurance requirements. During the first six years of the
Superfund program, very few hazardous waste sites were cleaned up.2 19 The
program also has experienced political abuses and manipulations. 22° The clean-
ups cost far more than was expected, 221 and the $8.6 billion provided by SARA
falls dismally short of the estimated $100 billion needed to clean up all the aban-
doned hazardous waste sites.222 The current NPL has targeted just over 1000
sites for cleanup, 223 but EPA estimates place the number of potentially contam-
inated sites at over 30,000.224 Though SARA allows the EPA to recover money
217. Eleven House and nine Senate committees oversee the EPA, making the agency subject to
review by nearly 100 separate committees and subcommittees. In 1989, EPA officials testified before
Congress nearly 150 times. Additionally, Congress requests over 100 reports or studies from EPA
each year. Adams & Cox, The Environmental Shell Game and the Need for Codification, 20 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10367 (September 1990).
218. CERCLA expressly provides that it does not preempt any state from imposing additional
liability requirements regarding the release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988).
Additionally, CERCLA provides that it does not affect a state's ability to redress mismanage-
ment of hazardous waste under state law, including common law. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (1988).
219. See supra note 216.
220. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
221. A good example of the tremendous cost associated with cleaning up Superfund sites is the
$11.6 million it cost to clean up the only private residence on the National Priorities List (NPL).
Completed on June 19, 1989, the residence had been contaminated by radioactivity from a college
professor's radium experiments more than 40 years earlier. The final cost was more than double the
$4.5 million estimate when the Landsdowne, Pa. home property was first placed on the NPL in
1985.
The project involved tearing down the two-family house and two neighboring garages, and
digging up and disposing of 4000 tons of contaminated soil. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 474 (June 23,
1989).
222. Note, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Limiting Judicial Review
to the Administrative Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the EPA, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1152 n.3
(1989) (citing H.R. REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1988)). SARA required the
EPA to begin new cleanup work at 175 NPL sites by October 17, 1989, and the EPA met that
deadline by beginning work at 178 NPL sites. The addition of cleanup activity at 178 sites brought
the total number of NPL sites being cleaned up to 254. SARA also required the EPA to begin at
least 275 new cleanup studies by the same October date. EPA surpassed this requirement by begin-
ning 318 studies. Despite meeting these increased activity deadlines, the EPA still has money
problems. President Bush asked Congress to appropriate $1.75 billion for Superflmd for fiscal 1990,
but that amount was cut by $200 million. Across-the-board budget cuts that went into effect Octo-
ber 16, 1989, cut an additional $77 million from Superfund. All told, the EPA expected its cleanup
budget for 1990 to be 25% less than the agency's 1989 budget. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1135-36 (Nov.
3, 1989).
The EPA's general operating budget in 1981 was $1.95 billion and had grown to only a pro-
posed $2.15 billion by 1991. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1802 (Feb. 23, 1990). Such a small increase may
call into question the EPA's ability to monitor hazardous waste storage facilities and address viola-
tions with appropriate sanctions.
223. As of October 1989, the NPL was expected to contain 1194 sites when finalized. 20 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1015-16 (Oct. 6, 1990).
224. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10388 (Sept. 1989) (citing ENVIRONMFNTAL PROTEC-
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spent on cleanups, the government has, to date, recovered little of the public
funds spent on cleanup. 225 The states themselves have varying numbers of haz-
ardous waste sites on the national priorities clean-up list,226 and thus some states
will serve to gain handsomely from the program and others will benefit only
minimally if at all.227 Further, EPA may periodically remove a site from the
NPL without taking action,228 or halt the process of placing additional sites on
the NPL because of changing classification criteria.229 Having a site listed does
not guarantee a state that the site will remain on the list, that the EPA will have
enough money to clean up the site once it finally gets to it, or that there will not
be additional costs continuing long after the initial clean-up work has been com-
pleted.230 Additionally, many states face major expenditures for cleanup of dan-
gerous hazardous waste sites, whether or not they meet their capacity assurance
requirement. North Carolina, for example, has approximately 900 abandoned
hazardous and toxic waste disposal sites in need of treatment, 231 but has only
twenty-three sites on EPA's National Priorities List.232 Also, many states have
TION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES: EPA's UPDATE 93-94 (Aug.
1988) (#EPA-230-07-88-033)).
225. Since passage of SARA in 1986, EPA has referred to the Justice Department only three
unilateral suits against responsible parties to compel them to pay for the cleanup. At the end of
January 1989, EPA had recovered a total of $126 million, or only 2.9% of the total amount spent
under Superfund to that date. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 108 (May 12, 1989).
226. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300, App. B (1989).
227. The Chem Waste court notes that withholding Superfund remedial money seems to work
because "almost every state had at least one site on the [National Priorities] list." Chem Waste, 910
F.2d at 721 n.l1.
An EPA report released May 12, 1989, found that the top 50 hazardous waste generators in the
United States, out of a total of 21,728 hazardous waste generators, produce 80% of all hazardous
waste produced annually. Thus, less than 5% of hazardous waste generators accounted for almost
all the nation's annual hazardous waste production. The report only discussed RCRA-regulated
hazardous waste. Another 300 million metric tons of hazardous waste are generated annually, but
are exempt from RCRA and are regulated under the Clean Water Act. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 149
(May 19, 1989).
228. For example, a Pennsylvania landfill site that had been placed on the National Priorities
List in July 1987 was removed from the NPL in March 1990 without any cleanup having occurred.
The site had been placed on the list because of its potential effects on the area's drinking water, but
the EPA subsequently decided that the landfill posed no immediate threat to human health or the
environment. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1868 (Mar. 16, 1990).
On September 29, 1989, the EPA, in announcing the addition of 93 hazardous waste sites to the
NPL, also announced that it was removing 31 sites from the NPL because they did not score high
enough under the agency's new hazard ranking system. 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1015-16 (Oct. 6,
1989).
229. In June of 1990, the EPA's program for listing new NPL sites "stopped in its tracks" until
the Office of Management and Budget cleared a new system for ranking sites. At that time the EPA
had not listed any new sites since October 1989, and then only a small number of sites had been
listed. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 416-17 (June 29, 1990).
230. Several states and chemical manufacturers have filed challenges to the SARA national con-
tingency plan. The dispute centers on the question of who should pay for the long-term operation
and maintenance of treatment facilities once the remedial cleanup at a Superfund site is completed.
The states contend that CERCLA obligates the federal government to pay for 90% of the costs
during the first 10 years of cleanup, leaving the remaining 10% to the states. However, the states
contend that the EPA's revised national contingency plan excludes some types of operation and
maintenance costs from the cost-sharing policy, thus requiring the states to bear those costs. 21
Env't Rep. (BNA) 340 (June 15, 1990).
231. The News and Observer (Raleigh), Oct. 4, 1990, at 1B, col. 5.
232. See 40 C.F.R. Part 300, App. B (1989) (listing the North Carolina sites on the NPL at the
time of the Chem Waste decision).
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their own "mini-Superfunds" to address clean-up needs within their borders,2 33
and thus are already preparing to bear some of the financial burden of hazardous
waste cleanup. If a state can continue to ship its hazardous waste to any other
state with a disposal facility, that exporting state may very well choose to do so,
preferring to handle the hazardous waste clean-up problem on its own and
avoiding the political tensions that accompany attempts to site a disposal facil-
ity. Because the sanction provided for in SARA does not limit a state's ability to
receive Superfund money for emergency cleanup, 234 exporting states have little
incentive to clean up their acts and accommodate their own waste. Finally,
Superfund money is designated only for hazardous waste sites that pose a threat
to human health,2 35 leaving cleanup of the numerous abandoned sites in the
country that pose a threat to natural resources to the states, further removing a
state's incentive to comply with SARA solely to get Superfund money.
In short, Superfund is a program that to date has not worked properly, and
Congress is well aware of the problem.236 Because Congress has recognized and
attempted to address these problems; it is inconceivable that Congress would
have considered the program itself to be sufficient incentive to the states to meet
their capacity assurance requirement. Congress, by denying Superfund money
for remedial cleanups to the states that fail to meet their capacity assurance
requirement, did not intend to preclude all state action designed to encourage
other states to comply with SARA. The threatened cutoff of Superfund money
failed. to offer sufficient incentive for the states to comply, and also failed in its
attempt to serve as an effective sanction. In Chem Waste the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals erred in holding that Congress intended to provide the exclu-
sive sanction, and the court should have upheld the Holley Bill as an impliedly
authorized and permissible attempt by Alabama to help achieve the will of
Congress.
The decision in National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Alabama
Department of Environmental Management does nothing to dispel the assertion
by Justice Scalia that commerce clause jurisprudence "make[s] no sense."'2 37
This decision serves to make the state of Alabama the "dumping ground" for
any other state that prefers to export its hazardous waste problems rather than
233. For example, Pennsylvania has established a Hazardous Sites Cleanup Fund. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.901 (Purdon Supp. 1990). Unlike CERCLA, the Pennsylvania statute also
authorizes money from the fund to go toward cleanup of sites that pose a threat to natural resources.
Id. § 6020.902(a)(7); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae and Motion for Leave to Participate in Oral
Argument Submitted by the State of Ohio at 22, Chem Waste (No. 90-7047) ("many states now have
huge multi-million dollar funds which allow them to conduct site cleanups independent of financing
from the federal Superfund").
234. See supra note 90.
235. Under the EPA's current scoring method used to evaluate a potential Superfund site, no
site may be placed on the NPL solely because it threatens an ecological system. 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1372 (Dec. 8, 1989). A June 1989 study released by the EPA's Office of Policy, Planning and
Evaluation noted that the agency lacks a clear policy on managing ecological risks from Superfund
sites. The study found that up to 5300 hazardous waste sites awaiting action under Superfund may
pose significant environmental threats. Id.
236. See supra note 217.
237. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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deal with them in a forthright and expedient manner. In the process, the deci-
sion completely undermines the attempt by Congress to rectify this problem
through the SARA amendments. Surely a constitution that will allow the state
of Maine to ban totally the importation of out-of-state live bait fish for health
and safety reasons238 will also allow the state of Alabama to place a limited ban
on out-of-state hazardous waste, when that ban serves to protect the health and
safety of the state's citizens while also helping to effectuate clear congressional
policy regarding hazardous waste. Rather than being forced to swim alone in a
pool filled with the hazardous waste of its neighbors, Alabama should be allowed
to do those things necessary to ensure that in the long run every state's pool is
equally full, that every state is taking a swim, that every state bears it share of
the health and safety burden, and that prosperity and salvation indeed do come
to all.
ROBERT 0. JENKINS
238. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). Alabama Attorney General Don Siegelran used this
summation in his brief to the federal district court. Brief of Attorney General Don Siegelman in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 729 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (No. CV89-G-1722W).
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